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THE LABOR VISION OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
LEA S. VANDERVELDEt
INTRODUCTION
The thirteenth amendment' is often viewed as a commemora-
tion of the North's Civil War victory over slavery. The conventional
understanding of the amendment is that it abolished the particular
antebellum southern institution that subjugated black persons as
slaves.2 The texts of the congressional debates on the amendment,
however, contain a far richer vision of constitutional reform. They
address what constitutes fair and just labor relations. Highlighting
this labor vision is important both for historical reasons and for prac-
tical legal reasons.
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I U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
2 See H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTIrrTTION 290 (1973). See also Belz, The Civil War
Amendments to the Constitution: The Relevance of Orinal Intent, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY
115, 139-140 (1988) (postulating that the purpose of the thirteenth amendment was
to prohibit chattel slavery and establish a limited civil liberty centering on protection
of person and property). Scholars generally conceptualize any lingering significance
of the thirteenth amendment in terms of race relations, and even then the fourteenth
amendment's call for equality has tended to overshadow the thirteenth amendment.
A line of cases involving debt servitude also stems from the thirteenth
amendment. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1910) (holding that in the case
of an employee who breaches a personal services contract, "the contract exposes the
debtor to liability for the loss due to the breach, but not to enforced labor")
(followed in Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942)). In addition, there is the
somewhat aborted development of the notion of incidents of servitude. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (recognizing that the thirteenth
amendment concerned not just freedom from slavery per se, but also the freedom to
purchase and sell property) (followed in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)).
Finally, the recent case Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989),
brought renewed interest in the thirteenth amendment as the constitutional basis for
Congress' enactments of the Civil Rights Statutes.
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First, historians have often assumed that the progressive con-
cept of free labor originated in the Gilded Age, late in the nineteenth
century.' The Reconstruction debates indicate, however, that a fairly
developed notion of what constituted free labor existed at least two
decades earlier and, more importantly, that it greatly influenced the
discussion that led to the thirteenth amendment's passage.
Second, the thirteenth amendment offers contemporary reform-
ers an unexplored legal avenue for addressing employer threats to
meaningful individual independence. For most Americans today,
employment is central to their well-being, and the thirteenth amend-
ment addresses the relation of private power between employer and
employee.4 Although to date no court has substantively interpreted
the amendment as providing more than a right to quit,5 the thir-
teenth amendment can be interpreted to stand for a much broader
idea of employee autonomy and independence. The theme of free
labor that inspired the debates goes far beyond the limited issue of
slave status. As the members of the Reconstruction Congress
expressed their visions of fair and just labor relations, they gave form
and substance to the possibilities of redressing some power imbal-
ances in the employment relation today.
Many members of Congress envisioned the amendment as a
charter for labor freedom, and they defined that ideal in extensive
debates. For these members, free labor was not just the absence of
slavery and its vestiges; it was the guarantee of an affirmative state of
labor autonomy.6 They delineated the free labor ideal by a recitation
3 But see E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-
1877 (1988); R. Steinfeld, The Disappearance of Indentured Servitude and the
Invention of Free Labor in the U.S. (forthcoming 1989) (describing the decline of
indentured servitude in the early nineteenth century as contributing to the
emergence of the concept of "free labor").
4 Unlike the fourteenth amendment, the thirteenth amendment contains no
state action requirement. Compare U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 with U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 1.
5 See generally Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1974) (discussing the Supreme Court's limiting
construction of the thirteenth amendment during the late nineteenth century and its
occasional treatment of the amendment since 1968). Even the scope of the right to
quit is in question. It is fairly well established that a court cannot order specific
performance of a labor contract. It is unclear, however, whether the law can impinge
upon the employee's right to quit by imposing other incentives on employees to keep
them performing their contractual duties.
6 See E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 11 (1970). Carl Schurz, one of the
Republican party's leading orators, declared in 1860 that "[t]he Republicans stand
before the country, not only as the anti-slavery party, but emphatically as the party of
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of specific freedoms that were the inalienable prerogatives of the
working man.
7
A careful examination of this labor vision reveals a structure
formed- by three types of statements.' The first group addresses the
historical need to rid employment relations of the master's patriar-
chal dominion over all laborers in his household and to accord the
employee a realm of family and personal privacy free from employer
control. 9 The second describes the core concept of autonomy for
laborers in their social and economic relations with employers.'
0
The final group condemns certain specific labor practices as incon-
sistent with the spirit of labor autonomy." This three part configur-
ation is useful in exploring the amendment's reach in restructuring
the modem employment relation. 2 As scholars devote increasing
attention to the important task of exploring the baseline of rights in
the employment relation,' 3 the Reconstruction debates constitute an
important resource because they record the original attempt to man-
date constitutionally a minimum level of worker protection.
One would be mistaken to claim that the labor vision was the
free labor." Id Richard Yates, another prominent Republican, stated that "[the
great idea and basis of the Republican party, as I understand it is free labor.... To
make labor honorable is the object and aim of the Republican party." I&
7 See Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL
HIsT. 305, 308 (1988) ("The right to freely buy and sell one's labor was perhaps
foremost in the antislavery pantheon.").
I have consciously used masculine terms in referring to the subject groups who
play a role in this history: congressmen, freedmen, working men. Not only were
there no women in Congress, hence the use of the term "congressmen," the image
projected of slaves and working people in the congressional debates was distinctly
masculine. References to working women, free or slave, are extremely rare. This
reveals an important problem with the methodology of using framers' intent as the
orienting perspective for interpreting the Constitution. However, I prefer to draw
the reader's attention to the limitations of this gendered perspective than to assume
that using gender neutral language eliminates the problem presented by historical
patterns of bias.
8 See infra text following note 78.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 86-101.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 102-204.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 205-258.
12 This analysis is of particular interest today since many courts have indicated a
willingness to restructure employment rights governed by the employment-at-will
doctrine. See generally M. ROTHSTEIN, A. KNAPP & L. LIEBMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 752-99 (1987) [hereinafter M. ROTHSTEIN] (discussing recent
judicial alterations of the employment-at-will rule).
13 See, e.g., J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
(1983) (relating values expressed in nineteenth century judicial opinions to modern
labor law); Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to Deindustrialization, 65 TEX.
L. REV. 1071 (1987) (reconsidering the role of constitutional jurisprudence in labor
law).
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only major theme animating the thirteenth amendment debates.
Historical events rarely result from a single cause, and a single idea
rarely drives legislative action. In addition to purely labor-based
concerns, the thirteenth amendment debates reflected themes such
as racial equality,14 the importance of access to education,1 5 the
integrity of families, 16 and the natural rights of mankind. 17 Those
congressmen who had been influenced by the abolitionist tradition
expressed more concern over issues of race and divine salvation than
they did over issues of labor and the terms and conditions of employ-
ment."8 Nonetheless, beside the more religious abolitionist argu-
ments, one finds a number of speakers who focused on labor
conditions. The remarks of Senator Henry Wilson are typical of this
labor perspective. In explaining the position of the thirteenth
amendment's proponents, he stated:
[W]e have advocated the rights of the black man because the black
man was the most oppressed type of the toiling men of this coun-
try. ... The same influences that go to keep down and crush down
the rights of the poor black man bear down and oppress the poor
white laboring man.
19
This theme has largely been lost in the modem interpretation of
the amendment.2" Consequently, this Article attempts to recapture
the strong pro-labor theme that runs consistently through the
14 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1479-83 (1864) (remarks of Sen.
Sumner) (arguing against racial inequality).
15 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 118 (1864) (remarks of
Sen. Howe) ("I think that your amendment should go further than as I understand it
does. I think that when the American people command that these persons shall be
free, they should command that they be educated .... ).
16 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2955 (1864) (remarks of Rep.
Kellogg, quoting John Brown) ("What cared [the slave sellers] for the sufferings of
families whom they separated? ... They are men but ... they have no right to their
wives; no right to their children .... ).
17 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2978 (1864) (remarks of Rep.
Farnsworth) ("The old fathers who made the Constitution, the men who fought the
battles of the Revolution, fought for the rights of human nature, and they believed that
slavery was at war with the rights of human nature.").
18 See Walters, The Boundaries of Abolitionism, in ANTI-SLAVERY RECONSIDERED:
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE ABOLITIONISTS 3 (L. Perry & M. Fellmann eds. 1979)
[hereinafter ANTISLAVERY RECONSIDERED].
19 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866).
20 This Article does not make express claims about the thirteenth amendment's
precise meaning. Such claims would require an analysis of the various schools of
intentionalism. I am content to take the first step of identifying and tracing the
nature and influence of the free labor theme. For an excellent discussion of the use
of history in constitutional interpretation, see generally Powell, Rules for Originalists,
73 VA. L. REv. 659 (1987).
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debates.21 The Reconstruction debates are replete with images of a
much stronger interpretation of the purpose of the amendment than
ever has been put into practice in decisions of the Supreme Court or
actions of Congress. These images lie dormant in the history of the
amendment, awaiting their time to come.
I. THE RECONSTRUCTION CONGRESS AND ITS MISSION
The Reconstruction Congress confronted a heroic task. Con-
sider the unique magnitude of the historical moment: through a
series of congressional enactments, the nation attempted to elimi-
nate the slave status of four million working people, a condition on
which an entire region's economy depended. Although the Emanci-
pation Proclamation had already freed most slaves,22 it was, by its
terms, a one time event. 23 It was up to the Reconstruction Congress
to eliminate permanently the possibility of slavery and other forms of
extreme labor exploitation.2 4
The Reconstruction Congress could not have contemplated the
abolition of slavery without anticipating the profound effect this
action would have upon the entire legal structure of labor relations.
Slaves occupied the bottom rung in a progression of distinct status
positions: peons, bonded servants, apprentices, employees not
under written contract, employees under written contract and,
finally, professional status employees. 25 The abolition of slavery
raised the floor, and in turn altered the internal logic of the remain-
ing structure.
21 Why the dream of continuing labor reform seemed to die out after
Reconstruction is in itself an interesting issue. Similarly, it would be interesting to
reflect upon why judicial decisions have resisted the latent power of reform found in
the debates. An examination of these issues and their implications, however, must be
left to another day.
22 By its terms, the Emancipation Proclamation freed slaves only in certain
areas, notably those still in rebel hands. See The Emancipation Proclamation, 12 Stat.
1268 (1863). The Proclamation had no effect on the legal status of slaves in
Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, or Delaware. There was some doubt whether slaves in
Union-held lands had been liberated as opposed to emancipated or whether they
continued to be enslaved. See J. FRANKLIN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 132
(1965).
23 See The Emancipation Proclamation, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863).
24 See H. HYMAN, supra note 2, at 264 (discussing contemporary fears that the
Emancipation Proclamation might later be revoked). But see J. FRANKLIN, supra note
22, at 132 (arguing that slavery could not have survived the Proclamation).
25 Cf M. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 37-42 (1981) (describing the
difficulties of Southern slave law in attempting to categorize rigidly slaves and non-
slaves).
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The effect of eliminating slavery would necessarily be complex.
On one hand, the law defined the status of lower laborers in opposi-
tion to slavery. Distinctions were drawn between the types of control
a master had over his slaves and over his other servants. For exam-
ple, masters could beat their slaves, but not their apprentices.26
Laborers may have had little real autonomy from their employers,
but they could pride themselves on the differences between their sta-
tus and that of slaves.
On the other hand, there were great similarities between the
slave relation and other low-status employee relations. For example,
just as slave masters could sue someone who took away their slaves,
employers could sue someone who hired away their employees.
27
Moreover, slavery's existence and legal legitimacy encouraged
tolerance of certain abusive employment practices. Public accept-
ance of masters' prerogatives threatened to allow some of these
abuses to seep into employment relations involving employees of
higher status. Pro-labor speakers publicly expressed fear over a
threatened statute that would entitle masters to beat their servants as
they could their slaves. 28 In another instance, the Michigan territo-
rial legislature had enacted a "white slave law" that provided that
"any vagrant ... could.., be delivered over to any constable, to be
... hired out for the best wages. '"29
Similarly, one widely publicized incident of the antebellum
period demonstrated the volubility of abusive labor practices. In the
District of Columbia, a congressman shot and killed a headwaiter
who had refused to serve him a late breakfast. In acquitting the leg-
islator, the judge drew on analogies to slavery, where the law consid-
26 See Cannon v. Davis, F. Cas. 18 (C.C.D.C. 1807) (No. 2385) (ordering
removal of apprentice from cruel master); Vinalhaven v. Ames, 32 Me. 299 (1850)
(upholding cause of action by abused apprentice against master). It was unclear
whether indentured servants could be beaten and by whom. Compare Matthews v.
Terry, 10 Conn. 455 (1835) (stating that master may not corporally punish hired
servant) with Milburne v. Byrne, 17 F. Cas. 283 (C.C.D.C. 1805) (No. 9542)
(discussing Virginia law authorizing court to order corporal punishment of
disobedient servant) and Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 9 NAT'L B. J. 26, 49-50 (1951) (discussing an 1803 Illinois law that
provided that "[a] disobedient or lazy servant could be 'corrected by stripes on order
from a justice of the county' ").
27 See, e.g., Campbell v. Cooper, 34 N.H. 49 (1856) (action for enticing away a
servant); see also H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 452-65
(2d. ed. 1886) (setting forth law against enticement of servants).
28 See Speech by Senator Henry Wilson, How Ought Workingmen to Vote in the
Coming Election? (Oct. 15, 1860) (discussed infra notes 123-29 and accompanying
text).
29 J. RAYBACK, FREE SOIL: THE ELECTION OF 1848, at 237 (1970).
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ered stabbing insolent slaves excusable homicide."0 Northern
newspapers reacted with horror to the acquittal, while one southern
newspaper retorted that "[i]t is getting time that waiters at the North
were convinced that they are servants, and not 'gentlemen' in dis-
guise. We hope this . . . affair will teach them prudence."
3 1
These lessons were not lost on progressive reformers. Thad-
deus Stevens, in an 1850 letter, expressed the fear of slavery's per-
meation into white workers' conditions, declaring that "[t]he people
will ultimately see that laws which oppress the black man and deprive
him of all safeguards of liberty, will eventually enslave the white
man."32 Thus, many saw the abolition of slavery as necessary for the
preservation and enhancement of the conditions of white workers.
3 3
The abolition of slavery posed for the Reconstruction Congress
an important question of employment customs and rights.
34 If
freedmen were no longer slaves, what was their legal status as work-
ers? What would be the attributes of this new legal status? The
Reconstruction Congress recognized that the thirteenth amendment
would thrust the federal government into an area that previously had
been the exclusive province of the states.3 5 Congress realized it
would have to define the dimensions of the labor system's new
floor,3 6 and in the process it would have to examine the specific
attributes of the new minimum to decide if they were as objectiona-
ble as slavery's attributes. Simply banning slavery could not have
eliminated conditions of extreme labor exploitation3 7 or ensured the
employment liberty the framers imagined.
Of course, the Reconstruction Congress did not necessarily
speak with one voice. Some members intended to punish the South
30 See B. MANDEL, LABOR: FREE AND SLAVE 151 (1955).
31 Id.
32 H. TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS 56 (1969).
33 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1322 (1864) (remarks of Sen. Wilson)
(stating that slavery "bade the legislators of New Mexico enact a barbarous slave
code, and also a degrading code for the oppression of white laboring men; but those
legislators hastened to repeal those dishonoring cases, when the nation put its heels
on the neck of the slave power").
34 See Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope of
Section 1981, 98 YALE LJ. 541, 549 (1989).
35 Members often mentioned this point in opposition to the thirteenth
amendment's passage. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 104 (1864)
(remarks of Sen. Davis) ("[t]he States [must] have the entire and exclusive control of
their own local and domestic institutions and affairs").
36 See Sullivan, supra note 34, at 549.
37 Even the amendment's opponents recognized this point. See CONG. GLOBE,
38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2962 (1864). As Representative Holman of Indiana said: "Mere
exemption from servitude is a miserable idea of freedom." Id.
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for the Civil War,38 some grudgingly agreed to reforms in an attempt
to limit the advances of the most progressive members,3 9 and some
fought emancipation tooth and nail.40 As some members of Con-
gress argued for the new vision of worker freedom, others argued
that freeing the slaves from their masters would violate the Constitu-
tion's takings clause.4"
In the antebellum years, the halls of Congress had reverberated
with a wide range of opinions on the subject of slavery. (There was a
long period of silence on the subject following the caning of Senator
Charles Sumner on the floor of the Senate for his speech urging abo-
lition.42) By the time of the enactment of the thirteenth amendment,
however, Congress' composition had changed. The Civil War had
caused most of the southern states and their representatives to with-
draw. As a result, Congress was composed primarily of representa-
tives of northern states and, of these members, the newly formed
Republican Party constituted the majority and the moving force.
43
Though newly founded, the Republican Party had its factions too.
On one side of the party was Senator Henry Wilson's vision of equal-
ity for all laborers. Wilson sought to do more than simply abolish
the institution of slavery. He sought to usher in a state of autonomy
and empowerment for all working people or, at least, to create a situ-
ation where free institutions could continue to elevate the condition
38 See H. TREFOUSSE, supra note 32, at 362 ("At Lawrence, Kansas, [Senator
Benjamin Wade] delivered an impromptu speech in which he . . . threatened that
'another turn would be given to the screw' if the South did not accept the
Reconstruction acts .... ).
39 See, e.g., infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text (the speeches of Sen.
Edgar Cowan) (agreeing to the abolition of slavery but not to "revolutioniz[ing] all
the laws of the various States everywhere.").
40 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1364-67 (1864) (the speeches of
Sen. Saulsbury, a Democrat) (arguing against the proposed thirteenth amendment).
41 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1864) (remarks of Rep.
Wood) ("I insist further, that, as the States themselves could not justly take away
property or destroy social relations without giving just compensation [any
amendment the states approve] must.., be connected with the condition of allowing
the masters a proper equivalent for the property taken or destroyed.").
42 For a description of the caning of Sumner, see D. DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER
AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 293-97 (1960).
43 One hundred seventy-five Representatives voted on the second attempt at
passage of the thirteenth amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 531
(1865). Of these, 82 were Republicans, 63 were Democrats, and 30 belonged to
various other parties. See U.S. CONGRESS, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
AMERICAN CONGRESS 1774-1989, at 525-2096 (1989). Forty-four Senators voted on
the thirteenth amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1490 (1864). Of
these 44 senators, 30 were Republicans, nine were Democrats, and five were
Unionists. See U.S. CONGRESS, supra, at 542-2067.
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of working people.44 On the other side stood Senator Edgar Cowan
who, although a Republican, argued the Democratic line. Cowan
urged that the amendment strictly be limited to enslaved blacks, and
he adamantly resisted any broader interpretation of the thirteenth
amendment as well as any additional Reconstruction reforms.45 In
the end, Cowan lost his arguments against all additional reform
measures, including the fourteenth amendment.
Despite this disagreement over the amendment's scope and pur-
pose, Wilson's faction of the party, the so-called "Radical" Republi-
cans, is generally recognized as having carried the day.46 The most
progressive and articulate of these men, Senators Henry Wilson,
Charles Sumner, Timothy Howe, Jacob Howard, and Representative
Thomas Shannon, provided commentary and argument that outlined
the most complete vision of a more autonomous, less dependent
laborer.4 7 This group, with its vision of labor freedom, shaped the
debates and achieved the passage of the Reconstruction amend-
ments, including the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amend-
ments, and the Anti-Peonage and Civil Rights statutes.48 These
leaders, however, were not alone; their vision resonated in the
speeches of other members as well.49
In the Republican ideology, the degradation of one worker was
the degradation of all working people. Although the freedmen ran
44 See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
46 See H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875,'at 402 (1982).
47 Senator Sumner's position was to emphasize racial equality, see infra note 67,
although he also used the language of free labor. See infra text accompanying notes
166-69. Senator Lyman Trumbull's status as a Radical Republican is uncertain.
Professor Hyman argues that the Senator was a conservative, or at least defected
rightward later in the Reconstruction. See H. HYMAN, supra note 2, at 304.
48 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 606-07 (1866) (Senate passes Civil
Rights Bill); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1367 (1866) (House passes Civil
Rights Bill); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 3042 (1866) (Senate passes
fourteenth amendment); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3149 (1866) (House
passes fourteenth amendment); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1572 (1867)
(Senate passes Anti-Peonage statute); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1770
(1867) (House passes Anti-Peonage statute); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess.
1641 (1869) (Senate passes fifteenth amendment); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d
Sess. 1563 (1869) (House passes fifteenth amendment). See also E. FONER, supra note
6, at 11-13 (noting the Republicans' championing of the cause of labor freedom). But
see H. HYMAN, supra note 2, at 306 ("Radical Republicans did not cease being
Republicans. Needs for re-elections kept Radicals marching not too far in advance of
party peers or constituents, for fear of tumbling out of office. And many Radicals
were only relatively and intermittently in a Radical posture.")
49 See infra notes 140 & 148-51 and accompanying text.
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the greatest risk of being deprived of their rightful due, the Republi-
cans did not limit the scope of their labor vision to freedmen or even
to people of color. In addition to discussing the application of the
thirteenth amendment to Chinese and Native American workers in
the West and the Southwest,5" Republicans often characterized the
breadth of the amendment as limited to "neither black nor white."'"
Other members expressly disavowed that their interest in reforms
was for blacks alone.52 When Senator Richard Yates of Illinois
stated that he had never been "a one-idea man," and that he had
"never had the negro on the brain," he elicited laughter from the
Senate.53 That phrase became a shared joke for discrediting the
position of Abolitionists, who many felt were concerned exclusively
with the plight of blacks.54
Moreover, the Republican reformers' political roots were firmly
positioned to advance the cause of all working people. In 1860, one
of the party's leading orators declared, "The Republicans stand
before the country, not only as the anti-slavery party, but emphati-
cally as the party of free labor."55 Squabbles that drove the Aboli-
tionist and labor movements apart in the 1830s and 1840s united
them on the subject of the thirteenth amendment. In contrast to
pro-labor groups, the Abolitionists tended to eschew politics, and
their power base stemmed from churches and pulpits rather than
50 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1571 (1867) (discussing peonage
in New Mexico as modified slavery "inconsistent with our institutions"); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 498-99 (1866) (discussing rights of Native Americans
and Chinese Americans).
51 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Wilson)
(Freedmen's Bureau Bill's basis of representation); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1571 (1867) (remarks of Sen. Wilson) (Abolition of Peonage) ("[W]hile I have
been against negro slavery, I am also against slavery of this kind for white men."); see
also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2955 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Kellogg)
(attacking "[tihe atrocious sentiment that it was better for society that the capitalists
of the country should own the laborers, whether white or black"); CONG. GLOBE 38th
Cong., Ist Sess. 1202 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Wilson) (attacking "the atrocious
assertion that 'slavery is the natural and normal condition of the laboring man,
whether white or black' ").
52 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2955 (1864) (remarks of Rep.
Kellogg); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Wilson).
53 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 102 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
Yates).
54 Unfortunately, even the Republicans were neither free of racist sentiments
nor above using subtly racist comments for political advantage. See infra note 125.
The Radicals would, however, slam those who made blatantly racist remarks. See infra
text accompanying notes 184-88. One should not construe my depiction of the
Republicans as in any way indicating approval of their racist remarks.
55 Speech by Carl Schurz, quoted in E. FONER, supra note 6, at 11.
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political organizations.56 The pro-labor interests, on the other hand,
coalesced in the grounding of the Free Soil party in 1848.57 The
Radical Republicans of the 1860s evolved from the politically ori-
ented Free Soil movement rather than the religious-centered Aboli-
tionist movement.
The core principle of Free Soil's ideology was the universal dig-
nity of labor,5 9 and supporters, as a result, expected their labor
reform efforts to sweep up other disadvantaged laboring groups,
56 The Abolitionists never succeeded in forming an effective political party. See
Walters, supra note 18, at 17-18.
57 The Free Soilers, who took as their slogan "Free Soil, Free Speech, Free
Labor & Free Men," were a conglomeration of the Barnburners, the Conscience
Whigs, some Abolitionists, and land reformers. As Professor Rayback has described
them: )
While each of the elements present harbored fears, prejudices, and
predilections, they all had one cause in common-the advancement of the
democratic ideal. Full recognition of human rights and dignities and the
betterment of the welfare of the common man were their goals.....
Freedom of opportunity for the free man was the common desire of the
elements gathered at Buffalo. The leavening quality of this ideal
tempered old differences and gave birth to a new party.
J. RAYBACK, supra note 29, at 223-26.
Among the principles these elements embraced were such pro-labor themes as
those of the Abolitionists, with their program of personal liberty for all men, slavery
for none, white or black; the Barnburners, who were determined to prevent the
extension of an institution that completely denied democracy and to dedicate the
western plains to the free laborer, who epitomized the democratic concept; and the
Conscience Whigs of Massachusetts, who hoped to curb the power of the textile man-
ufacturers. In addition:
Land Reformers were intent upon improving the welfare and status of
[laborers] whose advance was being limited by an apparently excessive
labor supply .... They aimed at keeping the western lands out of the
hands of the great landlords and speculators by giving land to the needy
poor, who would thereby achieve the self-sufficiency and self-respect due
to all members of the nation.
Id. at 223-24.
58 See E. FONER, supra note 6, at 124-33. See generallyJ. MAYFIELD, REHEARSAL FOR
REPUBLICANISM: FREE SOIL AND THE POLrTCS OF ANTISLAVERY (1980) (suggesting that
the Free Soil Party's earlier experiences opened the door to American politics for the
Republican party).
59 SeeJ. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 55 (1988).
All free soilers-except perhaps some of the Van Burenites-concurred
with the following set of propositions: free labor was more efficient than
slave labor because it was motivated by the inducement of wages and the
ambition for upward mobility rather than by the coercion of the lash;
slavery undermined the dignity of manual work by associating it with
servility and thereby degraded white labor wherever bondage existed;
slavery inhibited education and social improvements and kept poor whites
as well as slaves in ignorance; the institution therefore mired all
Southerners except the slaveowning gentry in poverty and repressed the
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such as immigrants, bonded servants, and apprentices.6" The Repub-
licans' appeal encompassed the entrepreneurial efforts of middle
class small businessmen as well as those of manual laborers. 6 1 The
Republicans believed that all people, with the application of industri-
ous labor, could make their way into the middle class.62 The work
ethic was pervasive in Republican speeches, but so too was the belief
that the system should reward individuals who applied their efforts
industriously. Republicans believed that laborers were entitled to
enjoy the "fruits of their labor" 63 and the system of laws should
assure that they received them.
As a whole, the Reconstruction debates reflect a desire to
improve all workers' status by recognizing the dignity of labor, guar-
anteeing workers a wide range of opportunities for advancement,
and raising the floor of legal rights accorded all working men. These
three themes go well beyond the narrower notion of merely banning
a few types of legally sanctioned compulsory service. Within the
Reconstruction debates, one finds descriptions of an ideal state and
sometimes descriptions of a continual process of elevation. These
discussions envision a new minimum level of worker independence.
If the fourteenth amendment spoke in terms of equality of rights and
the fifteenth in terms of universal suffrage, the thirteenth amend-
ment spoke in terms of a set of minimum standards that laboring
men could expect in their employment relations.
II. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Text
Despite the extensive debates over the values and objectives of
the thirteenth amendment, the members of the Reconstruction Con-
gress directed very little attention to its actual text. The members of
Congress rarely considered whether the actual language of the
amendment conveyed the breadth of meanings its advocates ascribed
development of a diversified economy; slavery must be kept out of all new
territories so that free labor could flourish there.
Id.
60 The" text of the congressional debates vividly illustrates this point. See infra
text accompanying notes 112-15.
61 See E. FONER, supra note 6, at 15 ("[Republicans] drew no distinction between
a laboring class and what we could call the middle class.... [Tihey considered the
farmer, the small businessman, and the independent craftsmen, all as 'laborers'.").
62 See id. at 13-14.
63 For a discussion of the significance of this phrase, see infra notes 152-58 and
accompanying text.
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to it. In the end, the amendment's text was selected more for its
symbolic significance than for its ability to state the members' inten-
tion with exactness.
The Senate Judiciary Committee recommended that the amend-
ment read: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall
exist," and that was the language that Congress adopted. The Com-
mittee looked at several alternative phrasings,64 but Senator Lyman
Trumbull, the chairman of the Committee, reined in any objectors
when the final version was presented on the Senate floor. He com-
mented that while no one was completely satisfied with the amend-
ment's wording, it was unlikely that any phrasing could please
everyone.65 Trumbull's sentiment took hold and, as a result, there
were only two attempts to modify the substantive wording of the
amendment during the debate period:66 one by Senator Charles
Sumner, a supporter of the effort,67 and another by Representative
James Brown, an opponent who sought to qualify the wording and
64 For a comparison of these proposals' texts, see Hamilton, supra note 26, at
29-31. There are no records of the debates within the Committee. See id. at 31.
65 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) (remarks of Sen.
Trumbull) ("[I]f every member of the Senate is to select the precise words in which a
law shall be clothed, and will be satisfied with none other, we shall have very little
legislation.").
66 Senator Henderson of Missouri also proposed a modest language change:
"Slavery or involuntary Servitude ... shall not exist .... Id. at 1487. In addition,
some opponents tried to change the amendment's language drastically in order to
sabotage its passage. See e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1364, 1370, 1424-
25 (1864) (amendments offered by Sen. Davis).
67 Senator Sumner submitted substitute wordings to the Judiciary Committee,
and he also proposed new language on the Senate floor. He proposed that the
amendment read: "All persons are equal before the law, so that no person can hold
another as a slave .... " He continued:
Should the Senate not incline to this form, there is still another which I
would suggest as follows: "Slavery shall not exist anywhere within the
United States or the jurisdiction thereof...." This is simple, and avoids
all language which is open to question. The word "slavery" is explicit,
and describes precisely what it is proposed to blast.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1482-83 (1864).
Initially Sumner's objection appeared to be one of stylistic elegance. As he said,
he wanted text which would embody the law "like a precious casket." Id. at 1483.
Sumner, though, also expressed a substantive concern with the scope of the tradi-
tional language. He feared that the qualifying phrase, "except as punishment for
crime," was too great a loophole in the prohibition of slavery. Id. at 1488. Sumner
suggested that the term "involuntary servitude" was superfluous and introduced
doubt about the prohibition's absoluteness. "[S]lavery in our day is something dis-
tinct, perfectly well known, requiring no words of distinction outside of itself. Why,
therefore, add 'nor involuntary servitude otherwise than in the punishment of crimes
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted?' To my mind they are entirely
surplusage." Id at 1488. Apparently, it did not occur to Sumner that the additional
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lessen the amendment's impact.68 Neither of these individuals, how-
ever, could even engage his congressional colleagues in discussion of
the text.
The members of Congress were already familiar with the phrase
"neither slavery nor involuntary servitude" from the text of the
Northwest Ordinance.69 Other than eliminating chattel slavery, the
phrase carried with it no other fixed meaning. Instead, the language
assumed mythical proportions in the Reconstruction debates
because it was attributed to Thomas Jefferson.70 The members of
Congress took solace in the fact that although they were amending a
sacred document, they did so with the language of one of its original
architects. 7 1 Thus, the amendment stood, or would have fallen, on
the "Jeffersonian" wording recommended by the Committee.
language would be useful in the post-slavery state and that limiting the scope of the
prohibition to slavery could also be construed very narrowly.
Sumner's motion drew a response from Senator Powell of Kentucky, who
opposed the amendment altogether. Powell lambasted the Republicans, saying,
"[T]he negro absorbs your every thought. For him you will destroy the country ......
Id. at 1484.
Sumner eventually withdrew his motion, and it is difficult to know what to make
of his words and their rejection. It was late in the day, the Senate wished to get on
with the vote and, ultimately, he apologized for appearing obstructionist. The
important issue, however, is why neither the Judiciary Committee nor the Senate
accepted his suggestions.
One might suggest that Congress chose the language because pro-labor mem-
bers found the ban on involuntary servitude appealing in itself. The phrase "invol-
untary servitude" resonates much like the term "subservience," and that phrase
would have appealed to the anti-slavery forces that deplored the degradation of
labor. Moreover, contrary to Sumner's view, the phrase may not have been surplus-
age. Banning involuntary servitude broadened the constituency of benefitted labor-
ers beyond Southern slaves. Furthermore, by broadening the scope of the
prohibition to "involuntary servitude," the amendment's proponents could blunt
some of the criticism of opponents, like Senator Powell, that the amendment was a
one-idea proposition designed only to benefit blacks. See supra text accompanying
notes 53-54.
68 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 528 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Brown).
For discussion of this attempt to amend the language, see infra text accompanying
note 90.
69 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) (remarks of Sen. Dolittle
and Sen. Sumner). It had also been used in the 1846 Wilmot Proviso that applied to
the territory gained from Mexico at the end of the Mexican-American War. See J.
RAYBACK, supra note 29, at 23.
70 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) (remarks of Sen. Dolittle
and Sen. Sumner). Despite the attribution of this phrase to Jefferson by the
Reconstruction Congress, there is some historical evidence that he did not coin the
phrase. SeeJ. BARRETT, EVOLUTION OF THE ORDINANCE OF 1787, at 28-31 (1971).
71 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1488 (1864) (remarks of Sen. Dolittle
and Sen. Sumner).
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B. The Objectives: Three Approaches to the Labor Vision
Rather than examining the amendment's text, the debates
focused primarily on the amendment's objectives and expected
effects. For the Radical Republicans, a primary objective was to
bring about their vision of free labor.
While their aspirations soared, the Radical Republicans were
understandably naive about the forces necessary to bring about their
imagined ideal state. Many of the Radicals were self-made men of
humble origins who saw their own successes as evidence of existing
opportunity for individual betterment.72 As they recounted their
own paths to success in the debates, they emphasized the importance
of free institutions to elevate the working man 73 and the importance
of minimum labor freedoms at every step. 74 As Professor Foner has
described the Republicans, "It]he ideal of equal opportunity for
social mobility and economic independence seemed [to them] to be
not dreams but living realities."
75
A few others tacitly acknowledged that their ideal of free labor
did not yet fully exist anywhere, not even in the North.7' Although
increasing industrialization loomed on the horizon and threatened to
bring about greater concentrations of employer power, these con-
centrations had not yet become the norm;77 the average workshop in
the North still consisted of only ten workmen and a small amount of
capital.78 If the Radical Republicans were blind to the impending
threat to labor autonomy that would materialize over the next sev-
72 See E. FONER, supra note 6, at 16.
73 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1321 (1864) (remarks of Sen.
Wilson) ("Slavery fills the hearts of the Southern people... with its bitter scorn and
contempt for ... the institutions that improve and elevate [the toiling masses].")
74 See id- (describing the contempt which slavery has for "the policy that cares
for [the] rights and interests" of the working man).
75 E. FONER, supra note 6, at 29.
76 See infra notes 135-36 & 157 and accompanying text.
77 See E. FONER, supra note 6, at 31. Professor Foner wrote:
On the eve of the Civil War... these developments still lay largely in the
future. If economic mobility was contracting in Northern cities, the old
social opportunity was at least close enough in time to lend plausibility to
the free labor ideology. And in the rural and small-town North, the
Republican picture of Northern society corresponded to a large degree
with reality.
Id. at 33.
78 See id. at 31; see also S. WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOcRATIc: NEW YORK CrrY & THE
RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788-1850, at 114-15 (1984) (noting that
most craft industries and workshops were small enterprises, although manufacturing
and large factory enterprises were rapidly increasing in number).
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eral decades, they were, nevertheless, convinced that labor auton-
omy was their goal. Slavery was the obstacle to attaining this goal.
Three kinds of statements gave structure to the framers' vision
of free labor. First, speakers expressed concern that certain types of
relationships, principally non-labor relations, be excluded from the
amendment's scope. Second, when speaking of the core ideal of the
amendment, the Radical Republicans described a vision of employ-
ment relations in terms of substantial equality between employees
and their employers and sufficient labor autonomy to permit individ-
ual autonomy. These speeches were the most lofty and ambitious
but the least clearly defined. Finally, many speakers lamented the
post-emancipation state of the freedmen in the south. The framers
identified and clearly rejected certain private and state actions as
tending to perpetuate the dependency of this lowest class of labor-
ers. The framers condemned these specific actions as incompatible
with minimal labor freedom and totally inconsistent with the thir-
teenth amendment's spirit. These denouncements provided the
most concrete definition of the meaning of the prohibitions in the
amendment. While the framers could not clearly specify what free
labor was, they were emphatic in denouncing what it was not. They
labelled a variety of employment customs as "perpetuations of
slavery."
The debates do not fix a single, static meaning for the amend-
ment or the concept of free labor. Instead, they establish parameters
within which many interpretations are possible. The resulting
boundaries of meaning fence out certain relationships as beyond the
scope of the amendment. They encompass a vast array of possible
interpretations emanating from the statements of the framers' core
values and objectives. And finally, the debates mark certain customs
and actions as evils to be proscribed.
The amendment's objectives also continued to develop during
the tenure of the Reconstruction Congresses. The amendment's
terms evolved, drawing meaning from new contexts. Even after pass-
ing the amendment, the members of Congress continued to clarify
its goals.7" For example, Congress gave substance and meaning to
the term "involuntary servitude" for the first time after passing the
amendment and, to a certain extent, after ratification. This sequence
is understandable because abolishing "involuntary servitude" was
more forward-looking than abolishing "slavery." The term could
not be defined before the abolition of slavery because the worst case
79 See H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 46, at 387.
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of involuntary servitude, slavery, would dominate the discourse. The
term could be defined only in the context of the post-slavery state.
The amendment's terms gathered meaning over time in a partic-
ular rhetorical sequence. Pre-passage statements addressed slavery,
its evils, and the abolition of the institution. They stressed the deg-
radation of labor, "both black and white," that slavery created.
8 0
Members of Congress usually personified slavery as a demon or
monster that threatened the nation, a dragon to be slain.
8 '
Following passage, the dialogue shifted to attaining the ideal of
free labor.82 If the slaves were no longer slaves, what was freedom?
What was a free laborer? Unlike the pre-passage statements which
contrasted slavery and freedom, the post-passage statements empha-
sized the difference between the current conditions of freedmen and
true freedom.8 3 In this manner, the entire spectrum of debate
changed, as bondage dropped from view and the focus shifted to
labor autonomy, the positive objective.
The context for this shift of emphasis was the southern states'
attempts to preserve as much as they could of slavery.8 4 As Con-
gress deliberated over the passage of the fourteenth amendment and
the Civil Rights statutes, the Freedmen's Bureau gathered informa-
tion on public and private attempts to replace slavery with laws and
customs geared to achieving similar results. The remarkable feature
of this era was that Congress, while still in session, received informa-
tion from the field about attempts to circumvent the thirteenth
amendment, attempts by state and private actors to recapture the
80 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text, and infra text accompanying
notes 148-49.
81 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 142 (1865) (remarks of Rep.
Orth) ("Like the poisonous upas... like the old serpent, it entered our Garden of
Eden... and yet we have gentlemen within this hall of freedom ... who hesitate to
strike this last blow which shall exterminate the monster forever and ever .... ").
82 See infra text accompanying notes 165-69, 177-80.
83 In the language of literary theory, the shift was in the terms in opposition.
Pre-passage, the contrast was between slavery and "other." Post-passage, the focus
was free labor; the "other" was how far short of labor freedom were the existing
conditions of freed men.
84 One commentator writes:
Southern whites likewise conceived of the labor question as the driving
issue of public policy. As one Southerner explained . . . "You will find
that this question of the control of labor underlies every other question of
state interest." Former masters were neither prepared nor disposed to
deal with former slaves on the grounds assumed by free labor ideology.
They struggled to recreate the discipline and control of a slave system
Sullivan, supra note 34, at 549.
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labor of former slaves and reinstate employer dominance over their
lives. These Freedmen's Bureau reports provided the opportunity
for congressmen to decry specific laws and practices as counter to
the spirit of the thirteenth amendment.
It is against this backdrop that one glimpses the most concrete
details of the framers' labor vision. With these examples brought to
their attention, the framers had the rare opportunity to express their
disapproval of specific aspects of labor dependency as their labor
vision evolved, while claiming that they had already enacted this
vision in the thirteenth amendment.
One of the more interesting twists in the vision's evolution
occurred when southern lawmaking replicated the northern common
law of labor relations.85 Quite often, southern states passed statutes
that paralleled common law rules regarding the master-servant rela-
tion then in effect in northern states. These mid-nineteenth century
common law rules gave employers considerable power and discre-
tion, but the reports from the field convinced Congress that south-
ern employers could not be trusted with such discretionary power.
Hence, when the Reconstruction Congress examined some of these
established legal rules, members condemned them as incompatible
with their vision of labor autonomy. In rejecting these rules as viola-
tive of the spirit of the thirteenth amendment, the Reconstruction
Congress indicated the amendment's forward momentum as a vehi-
cle for change.
1. Beyond the Pale: True Family Relationships and
Perhaps Apprentices
Several congressmen's comments demonstrate their intent to
limit the thirteenth amendment's application to the labor setting.
These congressmen expressed concern that the term "involuntary
servitude" not apply to family relationships where the head of the
household legally held a property right in the services of other
household members.
This concern surfaced first in the arguments against abolition.
Representative Chilton White of Ohio, for example, argued against
abolition by equating the master-slave relation to the master's prop-
erty right in his apprentice, the parents' right to the service of their
child, and the husband's right to the services of his wife.
The parent has the right to the service of his child; he has a prop-
85 See infra text accompanying notes 203-04.
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erty in the service of that child. A husband has a right of property
in the service of his wife; he has the right to the management of his
household affairs. The master has a right of property in the service
of his apprentice. All these rights rest upon the same basis as a
man's right of property in the service of slaves. The relation is
clearly and distinctly defined by the law, and as clearly and dis-
tinctly recognized by the Constitution of the United States.
8 6
Representative White went on to say that breaking these prop-
erty bonds required due process and compensation."' To the twen-
tieth century mind, compensation claims seem inconsistent with the
notion of a familial relationship. Nonetheless, the pairing of a com-
pensation claim with the analogy to family ties clearly reveals White's
primary motivation. As he stated it, the slavemaster was entitled to
the same paternalistic property interest in his slave that he was in his
household."8 The argument was not based on the slaves' innate
dependency upon a master to lead and to protect them, but rather
on the notion that to rob a master of his slave was to rob him of his
paternalistic privileges. White's analogy between families and slaves
was a common rhetorical device at the time.
8 9
86 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1865) (remarks of Rep. White).
87 Rep. White declared:
The right to service in slaves, then, is recognized as property. That right
of property cannot be taken away from any person except by "due process
of law." "Due process of law," as I before remarked, imports day in court
and trial byjury. The only power, then, that can reach this question is the
omnipotent sovereignty of the State, which rises above and overshadows,
controls and molds, every other power and every other right and interest.
Why, sir, the right to possess and enjoy property is essential to the very
existence of man. We could not live without it. It is guarantied [sic] in the
Constitution. Maryland and Missouri have abolished slavery. How did
they do it? They did it by the exercise of the sovereignty of the State, and
consistently with this provision of the Constitution, guarantying [sic] the
right of individuals in property. They did it by conventions representing
the sovereignty of the State. They did it consistently with the provisions
of the Constitution, because the Constitution itself recognizes the
sovereignty of the States.
Id.
88 See also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1864) (remarks of Rep. F.
Wood, N.Y.)
The social and domestic relations are equally matters of individual
ownership with flocks and herds, houses, and lands. The affections of a
man's wife and children are among the dearest of his possessions.... The
domestic institution of slavery is one of these relations, and was
recognized in the states of this Confederation as a species of proprietary
interest.
89 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 2939 (1864) (remarks of Rep.
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The comparison to family relations emerged again in the
debates as the House prepared to pass the amendment. When it
appeared that there were sufficient votes for passage, Representative
Brown of Wisconsin moved to substitute a more limited version of
the amendment. Brown proposed wording that would have abol-
ished slavery and all involuntary servitude, "except that arising from
the relations of parent and child, master and apprentice, guardian
and ward." '90 Brown's reference to family was very different from
White's earlier use of the family analogy. Before passage, White
sought to defeat the amendment by analogizing slaves to family
members, but once passage was imminent, Brown had to break the
analogy by emphasizing the differences between the relationships.
For Brown, although the fight for slavery was lost, it was still impor-
tant to preserve the privileges of the master in his household. This
contrast conveyed an additional message: labor relations and family
relations are fundamentally different. The "servitude" that the
amendment encompassed was labor servitude.
Brown's motion failed, but the need to distinguish the slave rela-
tion from the family relation continued to occupy some members'
attention. After the states ratified the thirteenth amendment, Sena-
tor Edgar Cowan, the primary voice for a limited thirteenth amend-
ment,91 used the distinction to attempt to limit the scope of the
amendment.
Now . . . in all good faith, what was the meaning of that
[phrase, "involuntary servitude"]? What was its intent? Can there
be any doubt of it? . . . That amendment, everybody knows and
Pruyn) ("The relations of parent and child, of master and servant; the law of
marriage; the mode of alienating property; the law of descent; in short, almost all that
concerned the social relations, and the every-day life and pursuits of the great body
of the people, were left to be regulated by each State as it chose."). Representative
Fernando Wood applied the same analogy to children and apprentices. See id. at
2941 (remarks of Rep. Wood) ("The Constitution describes slaves, and I suppose
children and apprentices might come under the same class as persons bound to
service.").
90 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 528 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Brown).
91 Sen. Cowan was somewhat reluctant to break the analogy between slavery
and family. He said:
It seems to me that the slave ought not to testify for the same reason that
the wife ought not to testify either for or against the husband. Would you
ask a negro to testify against his master, to go back to that master and be
subjected to his ill-will because of his testimony?
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 96 (1865) (remarks of Sen. Cowan).
For a full discussion of Cowan's position, see infra notes 170-72 and accompany-
ing text.
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nobody dare deny, was simply made to liberate the negro slave
from his master. That is all there is of it. Will ... anybody...
undertake to say that that was to prevent the involuntary servitude
of my child to me, of my apprentice to me, or the quasi servitude
which the wife to some extent owes to her husband? Certainly
not.
9 2
Cowan's comment argued against applying the term "involun-
tary servitude" to anything more than Black slavery. Providing more
insight to his message, however, are the key relations that Cowan
identified as clearly beyond the term's ambit. He did not say the
amendment was clearly inapplicable to white working men; instead,
he was on safe ground when he claimed it was inapplicable to family
relations.
93
Cowan appears to protest too much, though. The fact that some
members worried that the term was applicable to family settings sug-
gests its meaning lay somewhere between restricting it to Black
slaves and extending it to include family relations. No congressmen
claimed the term should apply to wives or children, relationships
within the family which could be considered unequal and potentially
abusive. Many contemporary speakers, however, indicated that it
was not limited, as Cowan urged, to Black slavery and its vestiges.9 4
The distinction that the speakers made is still somewhat prob-
lematic, however, because it does not explain the classification of
apprentices. Both Brown and Cowan emphasized that the amend-
ment did not speak to the master-apprentice relation, and other ref-
erences in the texts also suggest that the framers did not intend to
abolish the apprentice's bound status. For example, in a speech
describing the freedmen's continued conditions of oppression,
92 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 499 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Cowan).
93 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1784 (1866) (Civil Rights Bill)
(remarks of Sen. Cowan).
What was the involuntary servitude mentioned there? Was it the service
that was due from the minor to his parent? Was it the right the husband
had to the services of his wife? Nobody can pretend that those things
were within the purview of that amendment; nobody believes it. It was
mentioned as a matter of ridicule, in some places, that it did actually
liberate the minor from the control of his parent or guardian; that it did
actually entitle the wife to be paid for her own services, that they should
not go to the husband; but that was false.
Id Again in this speech, the senator sought to interpret "involuntary servitude" as
co-extensive with black slavery.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 46-51. Today there is little argument that
the amendment applies regardless of race or previous condition of slavery. See Bailey
v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 240-41 (1911).
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Thomas Eliot of Massachusetts made a curious, but significant, refer-
ence to apprenticeship: "All [the Freedmen's Bureau's] reports are
replete with instances of violence and cruelty towards the freedmen -
murders, whipping, tying up by the thumbs, defrauding of wages,
overworking, combining for purposes of extortion, and binding out of
children as apprentices without their parent's consent.. ..9'
Eliot's outrage did not stem from the practice of binding out
children, but rather from the fact that there was no parental consent.
The distinction between familial relations and employment relations
explains the position.
At the time of the amendment's consideration, apprenticeships
provided minors with vocational training.9" Fathers, for the most
part, bound their underage sons to some master for training and
tutelage. The fathers, not their minor sons, were legally liable if the
boys failed to perform labor for their masters.9 7 Fathers could also
exercise parental pressure to force their sons back into the master's
service. In essence, the apprenticeship relation was more an exten-
sion of the father's dominion of the family than the master's control
of the workplace. Apprenticeship was an extension of the family
relation more than it was of the labor relation. Unlike the slave rela-
tion, or other labor relations for that matter, the underage appren-
tice's true father was central to the relationship.
98
Despite the framers' indications that "involuntary servitude"
should not apply to apprentices, these arrangements eventually came
within the term's ambit. As patriarchal domination of the family
eroded, apprenticeship came to be seen more as a labor relationship.
Since the scope of the term "involuntary servitude" was broader
than slavery and narrower than family relations, apprenticeships ulti-
mately fell within the proscription of the thirteenth amendment. 99
95 H.R. REP. No. 30, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1868) (remarks on Bureau of
Freedmen and Refugees by Rep. Eliot) (emphasis added).
96 Apprenticeships declined throughout the 19th century, but were not
completely obsolete until the Spanish-American War. See W. RORABAUGH, THE CRAFr
APPRENTICE 208-09 (1986).
97 See H. WOOD supra note 27, at 44-92.
98 By the end of the 19th century, apprenticeships became obsolete, in part
because fathers' control over their sons eroded, and fathers could no longer
discipline their sons or speak for their sons' labor. As a result, the master had little
hope of enforcing labor bonds against the fathers. Other factors led to the decline of
the institution, too. For example, when the standard means of production changed,
masters no longer held the valuable secrets they once could pass on to willing
apprentices in exchange for years of service. See W. RORABAUGH, supra note 96, at
208-09.
99 By 1911, the Supreme Court's language in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219
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This move to split the labor relation from the family relation is
significant in the context of reforms generally occurring in employ-
ment relations over the course of the nineteenth century. In the
household workshop industry of the early nineteenth century, the
master's servant was a member of his household, part of his private
domain °00 Neither the servant who lived in the master's household
nor the slave had any private domain of his own. Freeing the slave
from the master's family was a necessary step to viewing the employ-
ment relation as more public than private and, accordingly, to grant-
ing the servant his own protected sphere of private domain, a sphere
that would be beyond the master's control.10'
2. The Core Ideal of Free Labor
The framers envisioned free labor as an ideal state, where with
the help of free institutions, workers could elevate themselves to be
their employer's equals. In this ideal state, free labor meant not just
upward mobility of a few workers but the levelling of class differen-
tials between laborer and employer, by raising the status of laborers.
The speakers' rhetoric oscillated between claims that laborers were
(1911), officially ended bound apprenticeships. The modern view of the thirteenth
amendment is that it abolished bound apprenticeships as well as slavery. Yet, as late
as 1877, Horace Wood described the status of Apprenticeship as one of the two
general labor status categories of the day. See H. WOOD, supra note 27, at 2.
100 In the legal relationship of dependence (master and servant, husband
and wife, parent and child) . .. [the head of household] was given, in varying
degrees, legal jurisdiction or control over [his dependents]. The
jurisdiction included rights to their services, and even, in certain cases,
rights to chastise or confine them....
At the same time, the Revolution advanced the transformation of
another one of the traditional relationships of dependence. Though the
process would not be complete until sometime in the nineteenth century,
the master/servant relationship also underwent reconceptualization. In the
place of a purely hierarchical relationship of dependence and governance,
employment would be understood to retain the legal right to govern
themselves under all circumstances.
Steinfeld, Proerty and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REv. 335, 344-
45, 350-51 (1989). Professor Steinfeld goes on to explain how these forces were in
tension throughout the 19th century and gave rise to the concern in the wage slavery
debate that the power of employers' property ownership made employees slaves. Id.
at 366-370.
101 In other speeches Congress took further steps to create that private domain
for the former slaves. For example, in his speech advocating the thirteenth
amendment, Representative Ingersoll stated, "[the slave] has a right to the
endearments and enjoyment of family ties; and no white man has any right to rob him
of or infringe upon any of these blessings." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.
2990 (1865).
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already innately equal to their employers and claims that, although
such was not the case, the laborers deserved to be treated as equals
and that the government should act to assure such treatment.
Sometimes the speakers framed the core ideal as a matter of dig-
nity. At other times, they spoke of the ideal strictly in economic
terms, such as opportunity for jobs, elevation, advancement, or the
right to ajust economic return for labor.'" 2 Speakers who gave form
to the ideal sometimes disagreed about the most effective means to
reach the desired end, but they shared a common view of that end.
The goal was independence which would come about by
enabling all freedmen to attain an independent base of property.10
s
In the minds of the Republicans, property ownership was within the
reach of all industrious laborers, that is, if obstacles to its attainment
could be eliminated. This labor ideology had been elaborately out-
lined in speeches made by members of the Free Soil Party, individu-
als who would later become Republicans with the founding of that
party in 1854. By the time of the Reconstruction Congress, many
former Free Soil adherents sat in Congress and had ascended to
leadership positions. These key members spoke about the thirteenth
amendment in the same terms they had used advocating free labor
before the Civil War. Thus, it is important to begin with the pre-
Civil War speeches.
a. Pre-Civil War Speeches on Free Labor
In 1857, Ohio Representative John Bingham made an impas-
sioned speech on the floor of Congress about the natural rights of
102 Ironically, conservative Republicans speaking against voting rights for
freedmen sometimes expressed quite lofty views of economic rights and dignity in
the labor relation. In Congress' labor vision, the right to enjoy the fruits of one's
labor was more basic than the right to vote. Several comments by more conservative
members and President Lincoln demonstrate that the basis for reading the labor
vision from the amendment is broader than just the views of the Radicals.
Representative William Windom of Minnesota, for example, made an apologist's
argument for the Civil Rights Bill:
It does not.., confer the privilege of voting for that is a political right....
It does not attempt to confer on the freedmen social privileges. It merely
provides safeguards to shield them from wrong and outrage, and to
protect them in the enjoyment of that lowest right of human nature, the
right to exist. Its object is to secure to a poor, weak class of laborers the
right to make contracts for their labor, the power to enforce the payment
of their wages, and the means of holding and enjoying the proceeds of
their toil.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (1866).
103 See E. FONER, supra note 6, at 11-39.
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man and the ennobling character of labor. His speech introduced
three core themes that were carried through the Reconstruction
debates. First, he argued that labor is central to value in the world.
Property, according to Bingham, was important because it was the
product of labor. For Bingham, this labor theory of property was the
foundation for constitutional protection of property. Second, he
attacked all class systems that subordinated laborers to those who
did not labor. To Bingham, true systems of nobility and dignity
should elevate laborers and denigrate non-laboring pretenders.
Third, Bingham argued that the laborer was entitled to a fair return
for his efforts. He said of the Constitution:
It protects not only life and liberty, but also property, the product
of labor. It contemplates that no man shall be wrongfully deprived
of the fruit of his toil any more than of his life. The Constitution
also provides that no title of nobility shall be granted by [the gov-
ernment]. Why this restriction? Was it not because all are equal
under the Constitution; and that no distinctions should be toler-
ated, except those which merit originates, and no nobility except
that which springs from the practice of virtue, or the honest, well-
directed effort of brain, or heart, or hand?...
I do but utter the spirit of the Constitution when I say, that
nobility cannot be conferred by the empty titles of a monarch, how-
ever august or however debased, bestowed upon his servile para-
sites, who "bow at every nod, and simper at every word." That is
not nobility, though throned in power and "clothed in purple,"
which crushes and enslaves the millions who lift up their haggard
faces, and stretch forth their shriveled hands, asking for leave to eat
of the crumbs which fall from their master's table. But, sir, there is
nobility in that patient, humble toil which makes a blade of grass to
grow where none grew before, thereby giving a drop of nourishing
milk to one of God's creatures. There is nobility in that cunning
handicraft which converts the wool, the cotton, the silk, and the
flax into beautiful fabrics, with which the form of humanity is
clothed. There is nobility in that sturdy arm of intelligent industry,
which lets in the sun upon the fertile earth, which plows its fields,
scatters the seed, gathers in the harvest, and gives bread to
nations-which hews from the forest and the rock the material, and
builds the habitations of man.
10 4
Bingham's language emphasized the central importance of
labor, particularly manual labor, to all merit in the world,105 and to
104 CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 140 (1857).
105 Bingham's language recalls the language of the English radical Ricardians
and the New York Radicals of the 1820s, such as Robert Owen. See S. WiLENTZ, supra
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all provisions in the Constitution. Property, to Bingham, was neither
a God-given entitlement nor a necessary cornerstone of a system of
wealth. Rather, the law respected property because labor created it.
Robbing a man of his property was objectionable because it robbed
him of his labor. Thus, the constitutional limits on the deprivation of
property really protected working people from being wrongfully
deprived of the fruits of their labor. Slavery and other exploitations
of labor were inconsistent with the property protections of the Con-
stitution.'" 6 Bingham's speech also heralded the theme that workers
have a more worthy claim to status and respect than non-laborers
clothed in a false nobility. Gaining titles without labor was parasitic.
The sweep of Bingham's language encompassed all laborers, the
master in relation to his servants as well as the master in relation to
his slaves.
In addition to the dignity dimension of the free labor ideology,
however, Bingham's speech implicitly recognized the economic
aspects of the ideology. Laborers deserved more than "crumbs
which fall from their master's table."' 0 7 This theme is less devel-
oped in Bingham's speech than is the dignity theme, and yet the seed
of an entitlement claim is there. Altogether, the essential compo-
nents of the core ideal of free labor are clear in this early speech of a
man who would become an active Reconstruction debate
participant. 108
Senator Henry Wilson was probably the most important speaker
on free labor ideology. An active Republican speaker and former
editor of the Republican newspaper, Wilson rose from being a cobbler
in the politically active Massachusetts labor movement to become a
ranking Radical Republican Senator.'0 9 In his many speeches and
editorials, Wilson elaborated upon and polished the labor themes
more extensively than most other congressmen, t" 0 and he became
note 78, at 162 ("Owen insisted, along with the Ricardians, that 'manual labor,
properly directed, is the source of all wealth.' He denounced capitalists as
parasites.").
106 This argument anticipated and countered the slave owners' argument that
abolition would be a taking. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 86.
107 CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 140 (1857).
108 For a discussion of Bingham's role in the fourteenth amendment debates,
see W. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 40-63 (1988).
109 See generally, R. ABBOTr, COBBLER IN CONGRESS (1972) (detailing Wilson's
political career, his rise to power, and his ideology).
1 10 His reputation for making anti-slavery speeches was so well known that
Senator Edgar Cowan claimed Wilson's thousands of speeches had gone to his head.
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 345 (1866).
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the Republican Party's point man in debates over the scope of the
amendment."'
In 1858 the debate over Kansas' constitution generated many of
the arguments that later would be utilized in the discussions of the
thirteenth amendment. Although the pro-slavery forces won the
Kansas round, when Congress adopted the Lecompton Constitution
and made Kansas a slave state, the exchange between Massachusetts
Senator Henry Wilson and South Carolina Senator Hammond
framed the labor issue for the debates to come. This exchange pro-
vided rhetorical rallying cries that appeared throughout Lincoln's
election campaign and in the debates over constitutional
amendment.
In his notorious Lecompton debate speech, Senator Hammond
analogized the condition of slaves to the condition of white laborers
in the North." 2 This analogy served as a significant foil and goad
for the free labor voices in future debates. Senator Hammond's
often-quoted words were:
The man who lives by daily labor-in short, your whole class of
hireling manual laborers and operatives as you call them, are
slaves.... The difference between [the South and the North] is,
that our slaves are hired for life-yours are hired by the day...
Your slaves are white-of your own race.
113
This powerful analogy both insulted the free laborers in the North by
aligning them with the degraded slaves and pointed out the com-
I I I See infra text accompanying notes 131-36.
112 According to Senator Hammond:
[AIll the powers of the earth cannot abolish it. God only can do it when
he repeals thefiat, "the poor ye always have with you;" for the man who
lives by daily labor, and scarcely lives at that, and who has to put out his
labor in the market and take the best he can get for it; in short, your whole
hireling class of manual laborers and "operatives," as you call them, are
essentially slaves. The difference between us is, that our slaves are hired
for life and well compensated; there is no starvation, no begging, no want
of employment among our people, and not too much employment either.
Yours are hired by the day, not cared for, and scantily compensated,
which may be proved in the most painful manner, at any hour, in any
street in any of your large towns. Why, you meet more beggars in one day,
in any single street of the city of New York, than you would meet in a
lifetime in the whole South. We do not think that whites should be slaves,
either by law or necessity. Our slaves are black, of another and inferior
races.... Yours are white, of your own race; you are brothers of one
blood. They are your equals in natural endowment of intellect, and they
feel galled by their degradation.
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., Ist Sess. app. at 71 (1858).
113 It, quoted in Speech by Sen. Wilson, supra note 28.
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monality of the interests between working slaves and working free
men." 4 If laborers were to continue to make advances, if free labor
institutions were to continue to elevate workers, it was imperative
that slavery be abolished. 1 5
Senator Wilson's initial response to Hammond broke the paths
for a number of avenues of future debate. Wilson repeatedly empha-
sized that slavery degraded labor, and he described the South as a
place where "labor is dishonored and laborers despised." Kansas
was the battle-field "between free labor which elevates, and that ser-
vile labor which degrades.""' 6 This degradation created the con-
trast, in Wilson's opinion, between the cultural and economic
richness of New England and the South's relative bankruptcy.'"
7
Wilson also took issue with Hammond's view that there would
be slavery as long as poverty existed."' Wilson's response here was
particularly significant because it demonstrated his position on an
issue over which labor and abolitionist groups had been deeply
divided. Abolitionists tended to be unconcerned whether freed
slaves found themselves in poverty. Labor groups, though, found
poverty to be as debilitating and objectionable as slavery." 9 Wil-
son's phrasings equating laborers and the poor indicated his alliance
with the labor rather than the abolitionist tradition.
To Hammond's argument that poverty is inevitable, Wilson
said:
114 "1 mean to brand these wanton insults to the free laboring men of the
country." CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., Ist Sess. app. at 170 (1858) (remarks of Sen.
Wilson).
115 See B. MANDEL, supra note 30, at 92-93.
116 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 175 (1858).
117 Wilson detailed this comparison with an extensive description of the culture
and economy of New England and the South. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st
Sess. app. at 171-72 (1858) (stating that the economy and culture of "[t]he Free
States maintain a position of unquestioned preeminence"). This argument about the
productivity of free labor was important in the constitutional debates as well. See, e.g.,
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (remarks of Rep. Ashley) (1864) ("under the
inspiration of free labor the productions of the country will be tripled and
quadrupled."); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 482 (remarks of Rep. Patterson)
("When this driftless system shall have been supplanted by an educated and
enterprising population of free labores [sic], the measureless wealth of her mines and
soil will pass into productive capital .... ). Beyond the regional chauvinism of this
comparison, however, remained Wilson's point that free labor elevates and servile
labor degrades.
118 Hammond stated that only God could abolish slavery because according to
the Bible, "The poor ye always have with you." See CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st
Sess. app. at 71 (1858).
119 See Glickstein, "Poverty is Not Slavery: American Abolitionists and the Competitive
Labor Market," in ANTsLAvERY RECONSIDERED, supra note 18, at 195-218.
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[The words] "the poor ye have always with you" [remind mankind]
of their dependence and their duties.... To men blessed in their
basket and their store, [those words] say, "property has its duties as
well as its rights!" To men clothed with authority to shape the pol-
icy or to administer the laws of the State, they say, "lighten, by
wise, humane, and equal laws, the burdens of the toiling and
dependent children of men!" Sir, I thank God that I live in a Com-
monwealth which sees no warrant in these words of inspiration to
oppress the sons and daughters of toil and poverty.
120
This -esponse foreshadowed Wilson's later emphasis on obtaining
substantive labor reforms rather than accepting merely a formalist
understanding of emancipation. Wilson saw the phrase "the poor ye
have always with you" as a reminder of the need for continual reform
to lighten the burden of working people rather than as an expression
of futility.
Wilson's speech is also noteworthy for its commentary on the
theme of labor equality and its criticism of class structure. To Ham-
mond's claim of the innate subservience of laborers, Wilson made a
very personal response:
I am the son of a "hireling manual laborer" who.. . "lives by daily
labor." I, too, have "lived by daily labor." I, too, have been a
"hireling manual laborer." Poverty cast its dark and chilling
shadow over the home of my childhood. ... Many a weary mile
have I traveled "[t]o beg a brother of the earth [t]o give me leave to
toil."
Sir, I have toiled as a "hireling manual laborer". . . and I tell
the Senator from South Carolina that I never "felt galled by my
degradation."... I was the peer of my employer; I knew that the
laws and institutions of [my states] threw over him and over me
alike the panoply of equality... I have employed others, hundreds
of "hireling manual laborers." Some of them then possessed, and
now possess, more property than I ever owned; some of them were
better educated than myself.., and many of them, in moral excel-
lence and purity of character, I could not but feel, were my superi-
ors.... I was never conscious that my hireling laborers were my
inferiors.
12 1
In this speech, Wilson set up conditions in the North as the stan-
dard for free labor. 122 He wished to extend this benevolent state of
120 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., app. at 173 (1858).
121 Id.
122 Just as the image of free labor in the congressional debates was male, see
supra note 7, so too the image was white. The congressmen tended to ignore the
existence and conditions of free black laborers.
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affairs to the people of Kansas, so it is not surprising that Wilson
spoke uncritically of the state of free labor in the North.
In October 1860, in the midst of the Lincoln-Douglas Presiden-
tial campaign, Senator Wilson delivered another significant speech
entitled, "How Ought Working Men To Vote in the Coming Election?" Wil-
son's objective was to persuade East Boston workingmen to vote for
Abraham Lincoln, primarily because of the party's platform that slav-
ery not be extended to the western territories. To make his case per-
suasive, Wilson had to demonstrate that it was in the interests of
Boston's white workers that slavery, an institution foreign to East
Boston, not be extended to a geographic region even more remote
to their lives.
Wilson's rhetoric is subtle in allying the interests of workers with
anti-slavery forces. Wilson purposely criticized labor exploitation in
a general manner for the first several minutes before subtly slipping
into the subject of slavery. In this long preamble, he set up the basic
tension between those who labored and those who exploited others'
labor. Not only did man experience the fall from grace in the Gar-
den of Eden, he fell to exploitation at the hands of other men.
Doomed at his fall from original purity and innocence to eat his
bread in the sweat of his face, man, forgetful of the brotherhood of
all humanity, has sought through all ages, to eat his bread, not in
the sweat of his own face, but by the enforced and unrequited toil of his
brother man. The powerful, unmindful of the sacred rights of a com-
mon humanity, have sought to avert from themselves the doom of
the race, by wringing from the weak the fruits of unpaid toil. To filch
from his brother man the bread gathered by the sweat of his face,
man has stained the world with crime. 1
23
Wilson then made his basic points: slavery was evil because it
destroyed much of the richest land in the South; it degraded labor
and the meaning of labor for poor white working men in the South; it
robbed the South of culture by degrading the efforts of laborers; and
it allowed southern aristocrats to further insult northern white work-
ers by demeaning their laboring efforts as crabbed and mean. It was
the association between labor and slavery in the minds of southern
aristocrats that demeaned the efforts of industrious northern labor-
ers. Thus, slavery pulled white workers down in two ways: one, by
direct competition with slave labor in the South, and two, by associ-
ating all the industrious efforts of workers with those of the degraded
slaves.
123 Speech by Senator Henry Wilson, supra note 28 (emphasis added).
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The second of these rhetorical devices is curious and revealing.
Wilson never risked insulting the East Boston workers by arguing
that their status was no better than that of a slave. He let
southerners in the Democratic Party make that equation. Again in
this speech, Wilson made use of Senator Hammond's line that the
only difference between southern slaves and the slaves in northern
workshops was that the former were black and slaves for life, while
the latter were white and hired by the day.
124
Wilson made a standard appeal to the brotherhood of all work-
ers, but his use of Hammond's rhetoric to make the equation
between black southern slaves and white northern workers conveyed
a different message. Wilson did not simply tell the white workers
that the slave's struggle was theirs. Instead, he emphasized that the
southern white aristocrats, who set themselves above slaves, would
set themselves above Boston laborers as well. Wilson's attack was an
attack on class hierarchy. Moreover, by allowing a southerner to
make the comparison, Wilson probably tapped some latent racist
attitudes among the white workers as well.1
25
Wilson's rhetoric stressed that the slave's cause was also the
cause of the white worker because an insult to one laborer was an
insult to all. He said: "Put the brand of degradation upon the brow
of one working man and the toiling millions of the globe share the
degradation. Slavery makes labor dishonorable ... ."126
Wilson's use of repetition was a more subliminal alignment of
the plight of the southern slave with the plight of northern workers.
Late in the long speech, perhaps at the point where the audience's
interest would otherwise have waned, Wilson created a repetitive
refrain. He quoted Herschel V. Johnson, the vice presidential candi-
date of the Douglas Democrats, for his belief that "Capital should
own labor."' 127 He wove this into a refrain akin to "This is the house
thatJack Built," adding stanza by stanza, but always ending with the
statement that that is the same Democratic Party that "believes that
124 Id
125 The undercurrent of racism in Wilson's speech is most apparent where he
quotes from Hammond: "Herschel V.Johnson... who avows that 'so help him God'
he 'had rather have one of his negroes President than Abe Lincoln the railsplitter,' is
endorsed by the Douglas Democracy of Massachusetts for his 'able and fearless
promulgation of Democratic truth'!" Id. The incredulity with which Wilson cites this
passage evinces not just the legal and practical reality that many Blacks could not
vote, let alone run for President, but the belief that thinking of a slave as a better
Presidential candidate than Lincoln was ludicrous.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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Capital should own labor." He made use of the sentence seven times
in all. It was the most repeated refrain in the speech.
128
The most interesting aspect of Wilson's speech to the white East
Boston workers was his alignment of their interests with the anti-
slavery interests in free labor. The only direct appeals to the condi-
tions of the workers in his audience were subsumed within the major
anti-slavery theme. Only at the close of his speech did Wilson men-
tion two concrete demands for labor reform that would directly ben-
efit northern white workers. Appealing directly to the "Workingmen
of Massachusetts," Wilson presented the audience with a series of
questions primarily about slavery and its influence. Interlaced with
such questions as "would you suppress the reviving African slave
trade," Wilson asked two questions that addressed the everyday con-
cerns of white East Boston laborers: "would you erase.., the more
infamous code authorizing employers to degrade white laboring men
with blows," and "would you adjust the revenue laws so as inciden-
tally to favor American labor."
1 29
For Wilson, being anti-slavery was a pro-labor position, and the
gains for slaves were inseparable from protections against employers
beating their employees or favorable tax treatment for American
labor. In his later statements on the thirteenth amendment, the
fused nature of these concerns would be even more apparent.1 30
b. Speeches Made While the Congress Considered the Thirteenth
Amendment
On March 28, 1864, Senator Wilson reiterated these now famil-
iar themes in his speech to advocate the thirteenth amendment.1
3 1
By this time, more than a year after the Emancipation Proclamation,
the nation knew that slavery was dead.' 3 2 Wilson stressed the pro-
spective nature of the amendment by repeating that the measure
would prohibit slavery "forevermore."' 3 In this speech, he again
128 See id.
129 Id.
130 See infra text accompanying notes 134-35.
131 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1319-24 (1865).
132 See E. FONER, supra note 3, at 66; see also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess.
225 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Jenckes) ("[S]lavery commenced the fight; it chose its
own battle-field; it has fought its battle, and it is dead.... Let us bury it quickly, and
with as little ceremony as possible, that the foul odor of its rotting carcass may no
longer offend us and the world.").
133 According to Wilson:
[T]he crowning act in this series of acts for the restriction and extinction
of slavery in America, is this proposed amendment to the Constitution
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portrayed slavery as having debased the southern "free" white
laborer by stigmatizing labor:
[When the Constitution is amended] the wronged victim of the
slave system, thepoor white man, the sand-hiller, the clay-eater, of the
wasted fields of Carolina, impoverished, debased, dishonored by
the system that makes toil a badge of disgrace, and the instruction
of the brain and soul of man a crime, will lift his abashedforehead to the
skies and begin to run the race of improvement, progress, and elevation.1
3 4
Wilson continued by making explicit that abolishing slavery
would affect the entire labor system:
[T]he nation, "regenerated and disinthralled by the genius of uni-
versal emancipation," will run the career of development, power,
and glory, quickened, animated, and guided by the spirit of the
Christian democracy, that "pulls not the highest down, but lifts the
lowest up."'
35
This link between the slave, the poor white southerner, and the
entire nation was crucial. It revealed Wilson's deep-seated belief
that the plight of slaves and laborers were inseparable. In Wilson's
mind, slavery dragged down the poor white laborer and the nation as
it crushed the slaves. With these words, Wilson shifted slightly his
reference to the ideal state. He did not just anticipate that abolishing
slavery would raise the South to the standard of free labor set by
northern laws, he predicted that the entire nation would be uplifted.
He continued to develop these themes later in the debates.1"
Other Senators took up these themes too. Senator Timothy
Howe of Wisconsin criticized slavery because it stole the slave's labor
and forced the slave to work.13 ' Both of these elements are present
in what he called his first "proof" that slavery was wrong:
[1f by my voluntary labor I have accumulated enough to buy a sack
of flour or a bag of corn.., and you deprive me of it by force and
violence, you commit an act which all civilized nations denounce as
robbery and punish infamously.... But if, instead of lying in wait
prohibiting the existence of slavery forevermore in the Republic of the
United States.... The incorporation of this amendment into the organic
law of the nation will make impossible forevermore the reappearing of the
discarded slave system, and the returning of the despotism of the
slavemasters' domination.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1324 (1864).
'34 Id. (emphasis added).
'35 Id.
136 See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
137 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 112 (1864) (remarks of Sen.
Timothy Howe).
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until I have accumulated that sack of flour or the bag of corn, you
employ that amount of force which makes me go to work, not vol-
untarily, not according to my will but according to yours, and accu-
mulate the sack of flour or the bag of corn, is it any the less robbery
for you to take the product as soon as it is accumulated? Is not that
robbery also?
1 3 8
In his second "proof," Howe reemphasized how the slave was
deprived of the rewards of his labor:
Now when you say that a negro is worth $750, what do you mean
by it? [You] mean[ ] that the negro can earn the interest of $750
more than the cost of keeping him.... Four million slaves, at an
average of $750 each, would amount to about three thousand mil-
lion dollars. That was one fourth part of the assessed value of the
United States in 1860 .... One fourth part of the product of the
property and of the labor of the United States went, where? Not in
the pockets of the laborer, not a dollar of it, but went into the pockets of
men who were permitted by law to own the laborer, taken by force,
taken by violence.
1 3 9
In the House of Representatives, members debated the issue in
similar terms. On March 19, 1864, the day of the thirteenth amend-
ment's introduction in the House, Iowa Representative James Wilson
(no relation to Henry Wilson) reiterated some of the free labor
themes. In a speech lamenting the lack of open discussion of slavery
in the South, Representative Wilson cast the anti-slavery claims as
pro-labor claims:
Where, except in the free States of this Union, have the nation's
toiling millions been permitted to assert their great protective doc-
trine, "The laborer is worthy of his hire?" What member of our
great free labor force, North or South, could stand up in the pres-
ence of the despotism which owns men and combat the atrocious
assertion that "Slavery is the natural and normal condition of the
laboring man, whether white or black," with the noble declaration
that "Labor being the sure foundation of the nation's prosperity
should be performed by free men, for they alone have an interest in
the preservation of free government". .. ?140
In this passage, James Wilson explicitly linked the plight of
138 Id.
139 Id. (emphasis added).
140 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864). James Wilson considered
free speech and free assembly necessary to the realization of the labor vision. He
believed that the same forces that suppressed discussion of slavery in the South
would stifle the advocacy of legal protections for the average worker. This concern
for free speech and assembly as a means to attain improved conditions for workers
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white and black workers and demonstrated that the anti-slavery prin-
ciple crossed racial lines. To bolster his point, he paraphrased a
southern defender of slavery whose proslavery argument was not
based on race. While pro-slavery George Fitzhugh claimed that
"slavery is the natural and normal condition of society,"'' Repre-
sentative Wilson stressed the labor aspect of the argument by substi-
tuting "laboring man" for "society:" "slavery is the natural and
normal condition of the laboring man, whether white or black." Most slav-
ery proponents argued the racial inferiority of blacks,' 42 so by para-
phrasing Fitzhugh in this way, Wilson characterized the thirteenth
amendment as a principle of universal free labor, not just one of
racial equality.
Few New England congressmen directly criticized the northern
labor system. Few directly conceded the degree to which employers
controlled the lives of laborers, and few used the language of "labor-
ers" and "capitalists." Members from the less industrialized Mid-
west and West made these points instead. Thomas Shannon of
California, for example, highlighted the problems of a class structure
where some lived off the labor of others. He said: "Slavery is incon-
sistent with [liberty regulated by law]; it makes the many subject to
the few, makes the laborer the mere tool of the capitalist, and cen-
tralizes the political power of the nation."14 Shannon elaborated on
the degradation of labor by lamenting a situation "where men and
women are compelled to labor illy fed, more illy clothed, and unpaid,
to the end that one, no better before God, should live in ease and
without labor ....,,144
Shannon also echoed Senator Wilson's concern for the poor,
white Southerner "whose vocation [was to] pander and pimp to the
vices of both master and slave, and ultimately dependent on both...
but an outcast from both and despised by both."'1 4 ' He proclaimed:
"[L]et it never be forgotten that our mission also is to elevate and
foreshadowed similar concerns that would come to a head as the union movement
grew later in the century.
141 G. FrrZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL! OR, SLAVES WITHoUT MASTERS 40 (C.
Woodward ed. 1960).
142 SeeJ. MCPHERSON, supra note 59, at 197.
143 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 2948 (1864).
144 Id.
145 Id-; see also id. at 2944 (remarks of Rep. Higby) ("Slavery was the rule and
freedom the exception, and the poor whites under its shadow were insignificant in
comparison with master or even bondsman."); Id. at 2990 (remarks of Rep. Ingersoll)
("Slavery has kept [poor white people who live in the slave states] in ignorance, in
poverty, and in degradation.").
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disinthrall that most injured and dependent class of our fellow white
men from their downtrodden and degraded condition, that they too
may be men, and enjoy the independence and rights of
manhood."'
146
As he condemned slavery and concentrations of employer
power, Shannon depicted his ideal of the free labor society:
I conceive, Sir, that that nation is greatest [where] the largest pro-
portion of ... people are educated, possessed of the comforts of
life, and are endowed with citizenship. Let the voting masses of
any country be composed of an independent yeomanry the major-
ity of whom are freeholders of moderate yet sufficient estate, let
them be fairly schooled, intelligent, each one bearing a fair share of
the responsibilities of the Government, and that nation will be
healthy; more, sir, it will be great in a noble sense that Rome was
great.
Small farms, small towns, manufacturing communities and vil-
lages, rather than cities or large estates, are among the conditions
of true national greatness. To each of these slavery is in
antagonism. 147
In a similar vein, Francis Kellogg of Michigan opined that slav-
ery threatened white laborers because "the atrocious sentiment that
it was better for society that the capitalists of the country should own the
laborers, whether white or black, found ready advocates among [the
slave holders of the South].' 4 8 He also noted, "[Southerners]
would degrade the laboring classes to a condition below that of the
peasantry of Europe and render it impossible for them to rise in
society." 149
Not all supporters of the amendment articulated the labor vision
as originally and specifically as Senator Wilson and other leaders did.
For many other members, the free labor ideology was invoked by a
set of frequently used catch phrases that had been coined by the
leading free labor spokesmen. The widespread usage of these terms
indicates how far the free labor ideology reached. One of these trace
phrases was the claim that slavery "degrades labor."'150 For exam-
146 Id. at 2984.
147 Id.
148 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 2955 (1864) (emphasis added).
149 Id.
150 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2984 (1864) (remarks of Rep.
Kelley) ("the dignity of labor"); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2955 (1864)
(remarks of Rep. Kellogg) ("degrade the laboring classes"); CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2948 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Shannon) ("degradation of labor");
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1369 (1864) (remarks of Sen. Clark) ("degraded
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pie, in a long bill of particulars discussing the evils that slavery had
produced, Senator Clark made sure to mention that slavery had
"degraded labor" and, in his more original phrasing, stated that slav-
ery had "reared an aristocracy and trampled down the masses." ' 1
Probably the most meaningful and repeated phrase was the
laborer's "right to the fruits of his labor."' 52 Representative Bing-
ham used this phrase in his 1857 speech on the labor theory of
value,' 53 and Senator Wilson used it in his speech on the Lecompton
Constitution.154 The phrase's origin is also significant. In the
decades before the Civil War, abolitionists and free labor adherents
who opposed slavery argued over the appropriate priority of
goals.' 55 "[W]hereas labor leaders tended to see abolition as a
diversion from the grievances of Northern labor and slavery as sim-
ply one example of more pervasive problems in American life, aboli-
tionists considered the labor issue as artificial or secondary."' 156 As
abolitionist and labor newspapers staked out their respective posi-
tions and exchanged editorials over priorities, the phrase "fruits of
one's labor" came to belong particularly to the pro-labor
adherents.'
5 7
labor"); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Wilson)
("Slavery could ... trample upon the rights of labor .... ").
151 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1369 (1864).
152 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
Trumbull) ("the fruit of their own labor"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 504
(1866) (remarks of Sen. Howard) ("the fruits of his toil"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 41-42 (1865) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) ("the fruits of their own labor");
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 200 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth) ("the
fruits of his own industry"); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 113 (remarks
of Sen. Howe) ("the fruits of their own toil"); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.
2990 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Ingersoll) ("rewards of his own labor"); CONG. GLOBE,
38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2979 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth) ("the fruits of his
own toil"); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 572 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Eliot)
("the proceeds of his labor").
153 See supra text accompanying note 104.
154 See supra note 116.
155 See generally Glickstein, supra note 119 (arguing that abolitionism in some
ways subverted inequalities within the northern economic order and in other ways
supported those inequalities).
156 E. FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 67 (1980).
157 In 1831, The Liberator carried an exchange between abolitionist William
Lloyd Garrison and labor reformer William West. William West argued that "there
was, in fact, a 'very intimate connexion' between abolition and the labor movement,
since each was striving to secure the fruits of their toil to a class of working men." Id.
at 62. One of the New York radical labor reformers, Owen Blatchly, included "the
fruits of their labor" as one of the four basic rights to which all men were entitled. S.
WILENTZ, supra note 78, at 159.
Ironically, Justice Marshall used the phrase as early as 1825 in The Antelope, 23
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In the language of the labor movement, a right to "the fruits of
one's labor" was a well-known critique of the industrial system where
employees were paid only wages for their efforts.' The phrase
stood for the claim that workers were entitled to something more
than mere wages: they were entitled to some share in the fruits of
their efforts. The number of times that congressional speakers
repeated this phrase is a testament to the labor vision's breadth of
influence.
Another important rhetorical device that tied the Radical
Republicans to the labor movement was the "wage slavery" debate.
Before the war, the labor movement often referred to the condition
of northern factory workers as "wage slavery" that paralleled south-
em "chattel slavery."' 59  Labor reformer William Evans noted:
"They do not hate chattel slavery less, but they hate wages slavery
more. Their rallying cry is, 'Down with all slavery, both chattel and
wages.' ,,160 Although there is no explicit discussion of wage slavery
in the debates, Reconstruction congressmen must have been aware
of the.phrase's dual meaning. s6 As Professor Foner explained:
"The Republicans accepted the labor leaders' definition of freedom
as resting on economic independence rather than, as the abolition-
ists had insisted, on self-ownership. To [the Republicans], the man
who worked for wages all his life was indeed almost as unfree as the
southern slave."'
62
One can only assume that when other members of Congress
resorted to these trace phrases of the free labor ideology, they
wished to invoke the more complete concept of free labor that had
been elaborated in the speeches of the movement's leaders.
U.s. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120 (1825) where he admitted that "every man has a natural
right to the fruits of his own labour" and then went on to uphold the slave trade.
"The dissemination of the writings of the English radical Ricardians in the 1820s
helped establish the [labor theory of property] as an attack on economic inequality
. S. WiLENTz, supra note 78, at 158.
158 See B. MANDEL, supra note 30, at 83 (noting that the labor movement also
argued for such entitlements as "easy and equal access to the land, public education,
a shorter work day ... and the abolition of slavery").
159 See id. at 77.
160 E. FONER, supra note 156, at 70.
161 See Berlin, Book Review, 36 DIssErNr 281, 282 (1989) (reviewing E. FONER,
RECONSTRUCrION (1988)). Berlin describes the wage slavery debate and concludes:
"Americans, whites as well as black, came to realize that in deciding the slaves'
future, they were shaping their own destiny." Id.
162 E. FONER, supra note 156, at 73.
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c. Post-Amendment Speeches on Free Labor and the Purpose of the
Thirteenth Amendment
As Professor Foner has described the event, when the thirteenth
amendment finally passed in the House, "[t]he vote set off wild
cheering in the galleries, while Congressmen 'joined in the shouting
• . .[and] wept like children."163
As Congress undertook the task of implementing the thirteenth
amendment, the debates moved into their next phase. Reports from
the field made the members realize that it was unreasonable to
expect the thirteenth amendment to be self-executing. The majority
of Congress believed additional measures were needed to prevent
freedmen from being pressed into some other form of servitude.
Two enforcement mechanisms in particular, a series of Freedmen's
Bureau bills and the Anti-Peonage statute, provided an additional
opportunity for Congress to more clearly define the thirteenth
amendment's meaning. As the debate over additional measures pro-
ceeded, speakers harked back to the original purpose of the amend-
ment, on which they had felt a common accord.
One method of preventing the freedmen from being enslaved in
another form of servitude was to construct for them certain rights.
These rights became the hallmarks of the free labor status. 164 Sena-
tor Wilson remarked:
163 E. FONER, supra note 3, at 66.
164 See Sullivan, supra note 34, at 550 ("These rights would enable [the
freedmen] to act as autonomous productive workers, who could hope to accumulate
some material wealth."); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 504 (1866)
(remarks of Sen. Howard) ("all civil rights" to freedmen); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2954 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Kellogg) ("rights which are inalienable");
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Ingersoll):
I believe that the black man has certain inalienable rights, which are as
sacred in the sight of Heaven as those of any other race. I believe he has a
right to live, and live in a state of freedom. He has a right to breathe the
free air and enjoy God's free sunshine. He has a right to till the soil, to
earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, and enjoy the rewards of his own
labor. He has a right to the endearments and enjoyment of family ties
Id.
The ambiguities of free labor appeared to be too much for some of the senators.
John Sherman of Ohio, for example, urged that Congress should specify rights in
clear language so the South would know what was expected.
It seems to me that when we legislate on this subject we should secure
to the freedmen of the Southern States certain rights, naming them, defining
precisely what they should be.... We should secure to these freedmen the
right to acquire and hold property, to enjoy the fruits of their own labor,
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[W]e must see to it that the man made free by the Constitution...
is a freeman indeed; that he can go where he pleases; work when
and for whom he pleases; that he can sue and be sued; that he can
lease and buy and sell and own property, real and personal; that he
can go into the schools and educate himself and his children; that
the rights and guarantees of the good old common law are his, and
that he walks the earth, proud and erect in the conscious dignity of
a free man .... 165
Securing these benefits would give workers independence and
autonomy, just as property protection meant independence and
autonomy to the framers of the Constitution almost a century earlier.
Senator Charles Sumner used a virtually identical list of rights
by reading from, of all things, the Russian Czar's 1861 proclamation
which emancipated the serfs. 166 The Russian proclamation itemized
the serfs' newly granted rights in a manner that paralleled the free
labor vision's hallmarks: the rights of family, contract, property, and
equality in the courts, political affairs, and education.' 6 7 As to the
rights of contract, Senator Sumner noted that the proclamation's
regulations specified the freed serfs' right to "inscribe themselves in
the guilds, and exercise their trades in the villages; and [to] found
and conduct factories and establishments of commerce." As Senator
Sumner described each category of rights listed, he repeated the
comment: "Surely here again is an example for us."' 6 8 He con-
cluded: "Surely a republic cannot in [securing the rights of freed-
men] lag behind an empire. . . . [A bill securing these rights] is
essential to complete Emancipation. Without it Emancipation will be
only half done. It is our duty to see that it is wholly done. Slavery
must be abolished not in form only, but in substance .... "
1 69
The post-ratification debates also featured a controversy over
the thirteenth amendment's core principles that culminated in a
heated verbal exchange between Senators Henry Wilson and Edgar
Cowan. This exchange presented starkly contrasting visions of the
good society and the purposes for the thirteenth amendment's
enactment.
Senator Cowan believed that the thirteenth amendment was
to be protected in their homes and family, the right to be educated, and to
go and come at pleasure. These are among the natural rights of free men.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1866) (emphasis added).
165 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1865).
166 See id. at 91.
167 See id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
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self-enforcing. He argued that the amendment did nothing more
than free the slave from his master and that enforcement provisions
should be extremely limited. Cowan, however, was the only Republi-
can to espouse this position in the Senate, and he eventually lost in
his attempts to limit Reconstruction reform to the enactment of the
thirteenth amendment alone.
70
Proponents of additional measures saw a much broader purpose
for the thirteenth amendment. These speakers, who were far more
vocal and numerous than their opponents, argued that the amend-
ment stood for a general freedom from labor exploitation. While
they all agreed that the amendment would be useless if it left the
freedmen only formally free, these advocates of broader reform dif-
fered as to which measures would bring about results. The fact that
Congress passed most of the proposed reform measures, even if in
some circumstances only to be vetoed by President Johnson, consti-
tuted an indirect referendum on the thirteenth amendment's
broader goals.
i. The Position of Cowan and the Democrats
As a steadfast opponent of additional measures to aid the freed-
men, Cowan sought to limit the thirteenth amendment's scope by
advocating a restrictive construction of its language.' 7 1 In the face
of additional initiatives to aid the freedmen, Cowan vociferously
urged a limited, formalistic reading of its purpose. In Cowan's view,
the amendment gave the slave no more than the right to habeas
corpus against his master. He maintained:
170 To avoid being clearly outvoted on later reform measures, Senator Cowan
absented himself when these measures came up for overwhelmingly favorable votes.
See M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND
RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1869, at 149 (1974).
171 Although Cowan voted for the amendment, he made only one minor
comment during the debates, asking whether the amendment would apply to family
relations and apprentices. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1421 (1864)
(remarks of Senator Cowan):
"[S]uppose that ... the United States requiring citizens of the-several
States for military service... were to disturb for a time the relation which
existed between the parent and child, the master and his apprentice, but
not disturb it long enough to cover the whole period of the tutelage or
apprenticeship; what would be the effect afterwards upon the discharge of
the minor or the apprentice from military service? Would he fall back
again into his natural place under the master or under the parent as
before? Is there any authority in this Government to prevent that return
to his original status of owing service either to the master or the parent?"
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The true meaning and intent of that amendment was simply to
abolish negro slavery. That was the whole of it. What did it give to
the negro? It abolished his slavery. Wherein did his slavery con-
sist? It consisted in the restraint that another man had over his
liberty, and the right that the other had to take the proceeds of his
labor. This amendment deprived the master of that right, and con-
ferred it upon the negro. What more did it do? Nothing .... It
gave to the negro that which is described in the elementary books
of the law as the right of personal liberty. What is that right of
personal liberty? The right to go wherever one pleases without
restraint or hinderance on the part of any other person.
... I will agree to any habeas corpus law that may be passed to
rescue the negro from any unlawful restraint of any kind. I will go
further . . . if anybody does restrain improperly of his liberty a
negro who has been freed by the amendment to the Constitution, I
will give the negro a right to damages against him, so that he may
answer in damages to the negro himself, and if you please you may
make kidnaping an offense.... I have no objection to that .... 172
Senator Saulsbury, who had been the thirteenth amendment's
most active opponent in the Senate,' 7 3 agreed with Cowan's posi-
tion. 1 74 Ironically, opponents of the amendment, like Saulsbury, had
construed its meaning broadly prior to passage in hopes of defeating
its adoption. 1 75 Now, these same conservative voices urged the nar-
rowest possible construction in order to limit its effect.
172 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1784 (1866) (remarks on the Senate's
attempt to override veto of the Civil Rights Bill). This language parallels Cowan's
earlier objections to passage of the Civil Rights Bill. Cowan said:
Enforce what? The breaking of the bond by which the negro slave was
held to his master; that is all. It was not intended to overturn this
Government and to revolutionize all the laws of the various States
everywhere. It was intended, in other words, and a lawyer would have so
construed it, to give to the negro the privilege of the habeas corpus; that is,
if anybody persisted in the face of the constitutional amendment in
holding him as a slave, that he should have an appropriate remedy to be
delivered. That is all.
Id. at 499.
173 See id. at 113 (remarks of Sen. Saulsbury).
174 See id. at 503 (remarks of Sen. Howard) (linking the interpretations of the
Senator from Delaware and the Senator from Pennsylvania).
175 Senator Saulsbury characterized the amendment's objectives as overbroad
and unworkable in light of history and the Bible:
We have grown... vain enough to imagine that had we been the creators
of the universe . . . we could improve upon the workmanship of the
Almighty. Had such been the case.., no Adam would have been doomed
to earn his bread in the sweat of his brow ... the air would have been
always balmy; the food of man would have been manna... [and] nothing
but happiness, universal happiness, would have ever existed.
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ii. The Position of Free Labor Proponents
Senator Cowan's rhetorical campaign for a limited construction
did not go unanswered. His statements set up an impassioned
response from Michigan Senator Jacob Howard concerning the
amendment's scope and intention.176 Identifying himself as a mem-
ber of the Judiciary Committee that had drafted the amendment, 1
7 7
Senator Howard blasted Cowan for construing the amendment's lan-
guage counter to its spirit:
[T]he absurd construction now forced upon [the amendment]
leaves [the freedman] without family, without property, without the
implements of husbandry, and even without the right to acquire or
use any instrumentalities of carrying on the industry of which he
may be capable; it leaves him without friend or support, and even
without the clothes to cover his nakedness .... [W]e are called
upon to abandon the poor creature whom we have
emancipated....
Now, Mr. President, I ask these gentlemen - I appeal not only to
their nowledge of the true principles of construction, but I appeal to their
humanity - to say whether it is possible innocently and sincerely to
ascribe to the advocates of this amendment any such cruel and
inhuman purpose as this? No, sir; I think they cannot [honestly]
say that in advocating this amendment we intended to leave the
negro in so helpless and destitute a condition. But if theirs be the
true construction, then it is competent for the Legislature of each
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1364 (1864). Rep. Holman, hoping to defeat
adoption, drew the implications of a broad construction of the amendment:
[Ihe Amendment goes further. It confers on Congress the power to
invade any State to enforce the freedom of the African in war or peace.
What is the meaning of all that? Is freedom the simple exemption from
personal servitude? No, sir; in the language of America it means the right
to participate in government .... Mere exemption from servitude is a
miserable idea of freedom. A pariah in the State, a subject, but not a citi-
zen holding any right at the will of the governing power. What is this but
slavery?
Id at 2962.
176 Senator William Stewart of Nevada was another respondent to Cowan's
assertion that the amendment did nothing more than provide habeas corpus. See
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1784 (1866). If Cowan was right, Stewart asked,
what was the point of the amendment's second section which gave Congress the
authority to pass legislation appropriate to enforce the amendment. "Would [the
freedman] not have.., a right to a writ of habeas corpus without any act of Congress
... ? If he has that right, and had that right at the passage of the constitutional
amendment, what was contemplated by the phrase giving Congress power to pass
appropriate legislation ... ?" Id. Cowan responded: "I have always been of opinion
that the second clause of that amendment amounted to just nothing at all." Id
177 See id at 503.
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State to declare by law that no negro who has once been a slave
shall ever.., have the right [of acquiring property, home, or fam-
ily]; thus leaving it in the power of these interested States to ...
deprive him of a home, to deprive him of all the fruits of his toil
and his industry, and finally to reduce him to a condition infinitely
worse than that of actual slavery, by compelling him to labor at
such price as the old master may see fit to pay him, while at the
same time, he not being a slave, has no claim whatever upon that
old master for support....
No, sir, such was not the intention of the advocates of this
amendment. 
1 7 8
Here, Howard turned the argument from a discussion of the
freedman's condition in comparison to slavery to a discussion of the
freedman's condition in comparison to the free labor ideal.
No, sir, such was not the intention of the advocates of this amend-
ment. Its intention was to make him the opposite of a slave, to make him a
freeman. And what are the attributes of a freeman according to the
universal understanding of the American people? Is a freeman to
be deprived of the right of acquiring property, of the right of hav-
ing a family, a wife, children, home? What definition will you
attach to the word "freeman" that does not include these ideas?
The once slave is no longer a slave; he has become, by means of
emancipation, a free man. If such be the case, then in all common
sense is he not entitled to those rights which we concede to a man
who is free?
179
Senator Howard's statement used the hallmarks of the free labor
vision1 80 to define the difference between slavery and freedom. He
repeated the invocation of family, property, the implements of hus-
bandry, and the instrumentalities of maintaining industry, in his jux-
taposition of the slave and the free state. Slavery denied these
hallmarks and, until the federal government ensured these rights to
the freedmen, they would continue to be in a state of slavery, or
worse.
The showdown between Senators Cowan and Wilson on January
22, 1866, however, was the most dramatic of the exchanges and
marked a turning point in the tenor of the debates. The issue was
whether to expand the Freedman's Bureau's powers so that it would
have jurisdiction in loyal states that deprived freedmen's rights as
well as in rebel states. By this measure the changes and reforms that
178 Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
179 Id. (emphasis added).
180 See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
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Reconstruction imposed on the South were being turned back upon
the North itself.
Senator Cowan made a long speech against the extension of the
Freedman's Bureau bill."' Cowan doubted that the federal govern-
ment had the constitutional authority to establish a Freedman's
Bureau in loyal states.1 8 2 He also expressed doubts about the accu-
racy of the reports about freedmen's conditions, 8 3 and he main-
tained that the nation was rid of slavery. In the course of the speech,
Cowan revealed his own views on race by ridiculing physical charac-
teristics of the Black race." 4 This speech also contained the most
poignant statement of Cowan's social vision:
There is a large amount of work that has to be done in this world
that has to be done by exceedingly humble instruments, and if the
instruments were not there the work would not be done. For
instance, if all men were to be as learned as [Senator Henry Wil-
son,] my friend from Massachusetts, who would black boots and
curry the horses, who would do the menial offices of the world?
And if they were not done I should like to know how we could live
at all. This world . . . after all is said and done, is pretty well
arranged, in my judgment, and always has been.'
8 5
This statement set up an opportunity for Wilson to articulate his
clearest statement of Congress' motive in passing the thirteenth
amendment. Cowan had expressed a philosophy that was an anath-
ema to everything for which Wilson and the Radical Republicans
stood. Wilson had always maintained that employees were properly
the equals of their employers." 6 Senator Wilson returned fire:
The Senator knows what we believe. He knows that we have
advocated the rights of the black man because the black man was
the most oppressed type of the toiling men of this country. I tell
you, sir, that the man who is the enemy of the black laboring man is
the enemy of the white laboring man the world over. The same
influences that go to keep down and crush down the rights of the
181 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 341-43 (1866).
182 See iL
183 See id. at 342.
184 See id. at 343.
185 Id. at 342.
186 See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 173 (1858). Wilson had long
been proud of his background as a manual laborer. In his Lecompton Constitution
debates he said, "I never 'felt galled by my degradation.' ... I was the peer of my
employer .... ." As an employer, Wilson said, "I was never conscious that my
'hireling laborers' were my inferiors," and concluded by announcing: "That man is a
snob .. . who assumes any superiority over others because he is an employer." Id.
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poor black man bear down and oppress the poor white laboring
man.
The Senator tells us that if all men were equal and all men
were learned, we could not get our boots blacked.... [That state-
ment] has been the language of the negro drivers in this country
for sixty years - of the men who had just as much contempt for the
toiling white millions of the country as they had for their own black
slaves. '
8 7
Wilson continued the attack by characterizing the positions
Cowan took on the matter through the last five years of civil war.
Clearly, the gloves were being removed:
The Senator from Pennsylvania tells us that he is the friend of
the negro.... He has hardly ever uttered a word upon this floor
the tendency of which was not to degrade and to belittle a weak and
struggling race.... If there be a man on the floor of the American
Senate who has tortured the Constitution ... to find powers to
arrest the voice of this nation which was endeavoring to make a
race free the Senator from Pennsylvania is the man....
I do not say that we have had to carry the Senator from Penn-
sylvania, for he did not go at all; he neither took himself nor let us
carry him.... He was not of us; he is not of us now, or he would
not rise here and utter these sneers about [the physical characteris-
tics of Blacks].
188
Cowan replied in kind, maintaining that Wilson was the one who
was off on his own and that the Senate had "to carry him". 8 9 At this
point, Senator Lyman Trumbull, who had introduced the amend-
ment and had the responsibility of maneuvering subsequent bills
through the Senate, attempted to keep the peace. "I was in hopes
that we would go on with the bill, avoiding this general discus-
sion."'19 Wilson, though, would not be appeased, even by his ally
Trumbull, and Wilson got in the last word.
I have not a doubt of what [Senator Cowan] will do in the future [to
resist additional reform measures] and I have not any doubt but
that the same result will happen in the future as has happened in
the past, that his counsels will not be the counsels of the Senate.1
9
1
Subsequent everits bore out Wilson's words of prophesy.
187 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866).
188 Id. at 343-44.
189 See id. at 345.
190 Id.
191 Id.
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Cowan rose again to urge his narrow construction of the amend-
ment, and he spoke against additional measures such as the Civil
Rights Act and the fourteenth amendment.' 9 2 He repeated his posi-
tion that the thirteenth amendment stood for nothing more than a
right of habeas corpus,' 93 but in the end, the Senate outvoted him
on every reform measure.'
94
After the fiery exchange with Wilson, few Senators bothered to
reply to Cowan's arguments.' 95 Edgar Cowan's voice had effectively
been marginalized, and the Radicals were generally able to prevail.
President Johnson later rewarded Cowan for supporting the de
minimis approach to Reconstruction with an appointment as Ambas-
sador to Austria, but the appointment went down in defeat when
Cowan's Senate colleagues refused to confirm him.' 96 Wilson, on
the other hand, continued to advocate labor reforms, and a substan-
tial majority in Congress solidly endorsed his proposal of the Anti-
Peonage Statute.
197
The clash of these two senators was more than a conflict of per-
sonalities. It represented a battle over competing views of the good
society and the thirteenth amendment's intended role in bringing it
about. As a leader of the dominant group, Wilson recognized the
significance of the amendment's race-based concern, 198 as his sensi-
tivity to Cowan's blatantly racist comments demonstrated, but when
Wilson made the most direct statement about the amendment's pur-
pose, his primary concern was for the least well-off laborer: "[W]e
have advocated the rights of the black man because the black man
was the most oppressed type of the toiling men in this country....
The same influences that go to keep down ... the rights of the poor
192 See id. at 499 (speaking against the Civil Rights Bill); see also id. at 2987
(speaking against the fourteenth amendment).
193 See id- at 1784.
194 See id. at 606-07 (Cowan voting against the Civil Rights Bill); id. at 1809
(Cowan voting against veto override of Civil Rights Bill); id. at 3042 (Cowan voting
against the fourteenth amendment's passage); See generally M. BENEDICT, supra note
170 (discussing legislative history of reconstruction reforms).
195 But see supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text (noting exchanges with
Senators Howard and Stewart). These exchanges were anticlimactic compared with
the full scale argument between Wilson and Cowan.
196 See WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA 124 (1963)
197 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1770 (1867) (House passes Anti-
Peonage statute); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1572 (1867) (Senate passes
Anti-Peonage statute). Wilson went on to become Vice-President of the United
States under President Grant.
198 "[Tlhe voice of this nation.., was endeavoring to make a race free ..
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866).
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black man . . . bear down and oppress the poor white laboring
man." 
19 9
In the post-amendment debates, proponents of the free labor
ideology differed among themselves on how best to guarantee freed-
men the fruits of their labor. Free labor spokesmen endorsed the
view that workers needed opportunity. For example, Representative
Donnelly urged:
If [the freedman] is not to remain a brute you must give him that
which will make him a man-opportunity.... If he is, as you say,
not fit to vote, give him a chance; let him make himself an
independent laborer like yourself; let him own his homestead; let
the courts ofjustice be opened to him.... If after all this he proves
himself an unworthy savage and brutal wretch, condemn him, but
not till then.
200
Others, attempting to put the brakes on Reconstruction, argued
that opportunity was there for the taking. After President Lincoln's
assassination, President Johnson initially followed in Lincoln's foot-
steps in advocating the welfare of the freedmen, but he later broke
with the Radicals and vetoed their legislation. In January, 1866,
President Johnson's message to Congress included a strong distribu-
tional claim that freedmen were entitled to a fair wage: "Good faith
requires the security of the freedmen in their liberty and their prop-
erty, their right to labor, and their right to claim the just return of their
labor."20 1 Senator Trumbull quoted that language in urging more
assistance for the freedmen. 20 2 The Radicals felt shocked and
betrayed, however, when President Johnson vetoed the second
Freedmen's Bureau Bill later that year. In explaining his veto, John-
son announced that supply and demand would take care of
everything:
[The freedman's] condition is not so exposed as may at first be
imagined. He is in a portion of the country where his labor cannot
well be spared. Competition for his services from planters, from
those who are constructing or repairing railroads, and from capital-
ists in his vicinage or from other States, will enable him to com-
mand almost his own terms .... [If] he does not find in one
199 Richard H. Abbott, Wilson's biographer, notes that this statement more
than any other represented Wilson's primary political and personal conviction. See R.
ABBoTr, supra note 109, at 260.
200 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 589 (1866).
201 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
Trumbull) (quoting Pres. Johnson) (emphasis added).
202 Id.
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community or State a mode of life suited to his desires, or proper
remuneration for his labor, he can move to another, where that
labor is more esteemed and better rewarded. In truth, however,
each State, induced by its own wants and interests, will do what is
necessary and proper to retain within its borders all the labor that
is needed for the development of its resources. The laws that regu-
late supply and demand will maintain their force, and the wages of
the laborer will be regulated thereby. There is no danger that the
exceedingly great demand for labor will not operate in favor of the
laborer.
20 3
The Radical Republicans scoffed at this idea. Quoting John-
son's optimistic appraisal of the situation, Senator Lot Morrill of
Maine said:
Now, Mr. President, consider that that language is uttered as a
reason for refusing to give the necessary executive consent to a law
designed for the protection of the freedman, designed to protect
him from his old master, to open up opportunities to him, to reach
out the hand of the nation and stand between him and absolute
want. To this homeless, houseless, defenseless wanderer who has
no abiding place, the Congress of the United States [offered the
nation's help] and ... the reply from the chief Executive is, "Leave
him to the laws of demand and supply."... In a condition of desti-
tution and suffering and want, the black man cries to the nation for
recognition of his manhood, for protection; the nation answers
back, there is for you no justice, no protection, no courts, no rights,
civil or political; in the language of the chief Executive, you are left
to "the great law of supply and demand.",
20 4
The three stages of debate on the core ideal reveal the perva-
siveness of the thirteenth amendment's labor vision. In addition to
the many speeches outlining the affirmative aspects of the free labor
vision, each time a public leader spoke against the idea, proponents
strongly and immediately rebuked him. From these discussions, it
appears that many members of Congress envisioned, or came to
envision, slavery's repeal as only a way station on the path to attain-
ing the ideal of free labor in substantive terms.
3. The Specific Prohibitions
The speeches that gave the greatest definition to the scope of
the thirteenth amendment, however, were those that responded to
203 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 917 (1866).
204 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. app. at 156 (1866).
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the immediate contemporary context. The reconstructing South
provided a set of examples to which congressmen could apply their
understanding of the amendment. A steady stream of reports
poured in, detailing objectionable labor conditions in certain south-
ern states. Congressional speakers denounced these employer
attempts at overreaching in no uncertain terms. These speeches rep-
resent the most concrete indicia of congressional intention.
In the pattern of labor provisions denounced by the congres-
sional speakers, one can see a blueprint for further labor reform.
The Reconstruction Congress, however, never deliberated upon or
enacted much more labor legislation.20 5 An increasingly hostile
Johnson Administration, as well as racist opposition to civil rights
and freedmen suffrage, thwarted the Radicals' efforts206 and sapped
the movement of its strength to continue reform. Nonetheless, the
congressional records chart an unfinished labor agenda which was
within the contemplation of the amendment's framers and which
formed part of the expression of the labor vision of the thirteenth
amendment.
As the South reconstructed itself, southern planters and politi-
cians borrowed contemporary northern labor laws and experimented
with their own novel legal devices. It was not surprising that the
South borrowed northern law in attempts to recapture the labor of
the freedmen since Southerners had routinely used the condition of
northern workers to justify slavery.20 7 Southerners had often
asserted that slavery's paternalism was beneficial because it provided
for the slaves' needs when little work was available and when they
were too old to work. By contrast, northern employers simply fired
employees when they were no longer of use. When northerners
attacked slavery, southerners regularly raised this comparison.
20 8
Once the slave system was banned, the South unsurprisingly insti-
tuted labor "reforms" that copied northern practices. In one of the
205 The exception is the Anti-Peonage Statute. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, 14 Stat.
546, ("An Act to Abolish and Forever Prohibit the System of Peonage in the
Territory of New Mexico and Other Parts of the United States"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1770 (1867) (House passes Anti-Peonage statute); CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1572 (1867) (Senate passes Anti-Peonage statute).
206 See J. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 67-73, 219-21
(1902); E. FONER, supra note 3, at 247-5 1; J. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE 513-16
(1982); H. TREFOUSSE, supra note 32, at 436-70.
207 See supra note 112 and accompanying text (speech of Sen. Hammond).
208 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 71 (1858) (remarks of
Sen. Hammond) (discussing the Lecompton Constitution and the proposed
admission of Kansas to the union).
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great Reconstruction ironies, northern members denounced south-
ern initiatives that closely paralleled northern labor laws.
In response to these southern initiatives, Senator Henry Wilson
opened a new type of congressional dialogue on the meaning of the
thirteenth amendment. "In several of these States new laws are
being framed containing provisions wholly inconsistent with the
freedom of the freedmen."20 9 Other members followed suit, recit-
ing a litany of examples from the post-war South and holding each
example up for edification.210 At the same time some senators, nota-
bly Senator Cowan, expressed doubt that the South was reinstating
the slave codes.21' The thirteenth amendment, Cowan claimed, took
care of slavery, so the reports of objectionable practices had to be
false. Senator Wilson responded by offering to furnish Cowan with
those legislative acts, or, as Wilson said, "I will take them and ana-
lyze them for his instruction." '2 12 Wilson never produced the prom-
ised analysis, but he did introduce a new pattern in the dialogue
which others joined.
Members began to marshall anecdotal information on southern
labor practices, including eyewitness accounts, texts of state legisla-
tive codes, and texts of private agreements by groups of planters.
213
The accuracy of these accounts, however, is not as important here as
the opinions expressed about the legal invalidity of such laws in the
face of the thirteenth amendment. These accounts were hypothetical
situations on which the speakers could express their interpretation of
the amendment. The speakers routinely concluded that these laws
and practices were inconsistent with the labor autonomy that the
thirteenth amendment guaranteed.
The particular instances of employee abuse that were held up
for examination and criticism assumed several different forms. The
most blatant were efforts to physically apprehend laborers who fled
from their employers; 214 however, most of the criticized practices
were more subtle and indirect. Among the more subtle attempts to
209 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1865).
210 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 588-89 (1866) (remarks of Rep.
Donnelly) (criticizing vagrancy laws and other prohibitions that several southern
states directed against freedmen).
. 211 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
Cowan).
212 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1866).
213 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 517 (1866) (discussing the
James River Farmers resolutions and other private agreements).
214 Some employers even attempted to use the state's power to help apprehend
workers. See infra text accompanying notes 232-34.
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recapture dominance in labor relations were a variety of employer
efforts designed to limit workers' subsequent work opportunities and
thereby discourage them from quitting.2 15 Other provisions that
received congressional criticism ranged from attempts to fix wage
rates216 to attempts to specify private conduct that would render the
employee susceptible to discharge, whether done on or off the
job.2 17 Even with respect to these more subtle practices, members
expressed their desire that the thirteenth amendment bar such indi-
rect forms of abuse.
2 18
It is important to reemphasize that the congressional dialogues,
as well as the text of the amendment, did not require state action
before the thirteenth amendment would apply. It made no differ-
ence to the congressmen whether the planters acted singly or in con-
cert, through private means or through their influence over the local
or state governments to achieve their ends. The central focus of the
congressional discussion was the amendment's effect on freedmen
and the securing of their substantive rights to be free laborers.
2 19
Some of the provisions held up for condemnation, the so-called
"black codes," applied by their very terms to blacks alone.220 None-
theless, a significant number of provisions that Congress identified
as incompatible with the thirteenth amendment were written in
racially neutral terms. Because the members viewed the efforts of
southern planters with distrust, they analyzed these provisions, many
of which would otherwise seem natural and familiar, in a much differ-
ent light. 22' Viewed with suspicion, these labor laws and practices
reflected starkly different degrees of power accorded to employers
and to employees.
Some of the provisions were criticized for their symbolism. At
215 See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
216 See infra text accompanying note 252.
217 See infra text accompanying notes 257-58.
218 Cf CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 150 (1871) (remarks of Rep.
Garfield) ("Congress is empowered to enforce the [thirteenth amendment] on every
inch of soil covered by our flag. Congress may by its legislation prevent any person
from being made a slave by any law, usage, or custom, or by any act direct or indirect.
This, I presume, will not be denied ... ").
219 See Sullivan, supra note 34, at 545-47.
220 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2611 (1870) (remarks of Sen.
Howe) (proposing conditional admission to the union for states with black codes);
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1865) (remarks of Sen. Sumner) (advocating
a bill for protecting freed slaves). This was true particularly when Congress debated
the principle of equality under the Civil Rights Bill and the fourteenth amendment.
221 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 365 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
Fessenden) (expressing distrust of the South).
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one point, Senator Wilson objected to the term "master" in the
phrase "Master-Servant" in the title of a southern legislative bill gov-
erning employment relations, 222 even though in northern legal cir-
cles this phrase was commonly used to describe the labor
relationship. 22' This incident typifies the heightened sensitivity to
post-slavery labor exploitation that resulted from the members' con-
cern with the power imbalance in the employment relation and their
distrust of the individuals exercising that power.
From the texts of the debates, there is little doubt that Congress
intended to accord workers the right to quit, but the parameters of
this right were more complex. In addition to widespread agreement
to prohibit specific performance of labor contracts, 224 speakers
repeatedly raised the specter of laborers forcibly being dragged back
to either their former masters or their new employers and subjected
to the boss's will.
2 25
222 Senator Wilson remarked:
A bill is pending before the Legislature of South Carolina making these
freedmen servants, providing that the persons for whom they labor shall
be their masters, that the relation between them shall be the relation of
master and servant .... [T]he bill now lies over waiting for events here.
That bill makes the colored people of South Carolina serfs, a degraded
class, the slaves of society.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 39 (1865).
223 One text published in 1886 states that the word "servant" is, in most cases,
synonymous with employee. See H. WOOD, supra note 27, at 2. Cases from the North
also show how common the phrase was. See, e.g., Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555,
567 (1871) (allowing an action for enticement of contracted "servant" away from
"master"); Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456, 460 (1876) (allowing an action for
enticement of contracted "servant" away from "master"); Tuel v. Weston, 47 Vt.
634, 634 (1874) (holding that the "master" is responsible for the hired "servant's"
negligence).
224 Even Senator Cowan, who consistently advocated the most restrictive
interpretations of the thirteenth amendment, concurred in this interpretation.
Cowan took as a basic assumption that employees could not be ordered to specifically
perform their labor contracts. He conceded:
Now, we are told the most impossible things in the world.... [W]e
are told gravely that the Legislature of Louisiana ... have provided that
... the laborer is to be at the mercy of the hirer. How? Has the
Legislature of Louisiana declared that a contract for the performance of
labor can be specifically performed, and that you can compel specific
performance in her courts? If she has such a law (and that is the only way
I know by which the laborer can be put at the mercy of the hirer in a
contract for labor; it is the only possible and conceivable way apart from
slavery) such law is clearly void, and there is no possible difficulty in
obtaining a remedy for it anywhere and everywhere.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1866).
225 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1865) (remarks of Sen.
Sumner) ("Thus is the freedman, whose liberty the United States are bound to
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The issue of specific performance reappeared in the congres-
sional discussion of peonage as practiced in New Mexico. 2 2 6 There,
white settlers captured Native Americans and forced them into ser-
vice. Refinements of this practice involved lending money, goods, or
credit to Native Americans and holding those individuals to work off
their debt. As the Congress debated the Anti-Peonage Act, members
contemplated whether the pre-arranged debt rendered the servitude
voluntary. 2 7 One senator, citing his own debts, felt this form of
debt servitude was outside the scope of the thirteenth amendment's
terms. 221 Senator Wilson insisted that even if occasionally the servi-
tude was "voluntary," it was "forcible" nonetheless and therefore
invidious. 22 9 Not coincidentally, during this same debate, Congress
also passed a statute abolishing imprisonment for debt.
23 0
In addition to these devices, there were other ways of keeping
employees working for their current employers. Employers struc-
tured private arrangements as well as legal relations to keep workers
from quitting. Some planters entered into compacts agreeing not to
hire freedmen without their former employer's permission, 23 1 and
some states passed statutes creating legal actions against employers
who "enticed away" laborers. A freedman's former employer could
typically bring such an action against any successor employer.
23 2
Both of these mechanisms prevented employees from taking
advantage of competing job opportunities and therefore denied
them a role in determining their own future. By conspiring in
advance to recognize the assignments of workers to particular
employers, the planters, in effect, treated their workers like property.
This system of recognized claims to workers violated the spirit of
employee autonomy that the framers cherished.23 3 Senator Trum-
maintain, to be handed over to compulsory service . . .[under the former master].");
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Wilson) ("The
Legislature of Louisiana has passed an act by which the Senator, if he reads it, will see
that any freedman who makes a contract under it is perfectly at the control and will of
the man with whom he makes the contract.").
226 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1571-72 (1867).
227 See id.
228 See id. (remarks of Sen. Davis).
229 See id. (defining peonage).
230 See id. at 1579-80.
231 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 93 (1865) (remarks of Sen. Sumner).
The most extensive agreement was the James River Farmers Compact. See id. at 517
(1866).
232 See D. NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK FORCED LABOR AFTER
SLAVERY 3, 5-7, 39-40 (1978).
233 See supra text accompanying notes 6-11.
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bull lamented: "[A] freedman is not allowed to hire out without writ-
ten permission from his former master; at least planters have held
meetings and have agreed not to hire freed people without such per-
mission. These facts are known to me from personal observation,
and written statements of reliable men."
23 4
The report on conditions in the James River Valley detailed the
most elaborate planters' agreement. 235 The James River Valley
planters drafted an extensive code, binding themselves to pay only
uniform wages and providing uniform terms and conditions of
employment, so they would not compete among themselves for
laborers. The planters also expressly agreed not to hire each other's
employees without permission.
2 3 6
The possibility that causes of action for enticement would be
recognized legally made the property nature of inter-employer rela-
tions even more graphic. In essence, the enticement action was an
action for trespass with the employee treated as the property. The
employer, then, had a right to exclude other "users" of the
employee's labor. Some southern states went as far as criminalizing
enticement.23 7 Senator Wilson labelled enticement actions as
"degrad[ing]" and "arbitrary., 2 1 Senator Donnelly viewed the con-
ditions created by the southern statutes as a reestablishment of slav-
ery: "[The employee] shall not leave that master to enter service
with another. If he does he is pursued as a fugitive, charged with the
expenses of his recapture, and made to labor for an' additional
period, while the white man who induced him to leave is sent to
jail.",23 9 Donnelly characterized the effect of these conditions as
"continued degradation and oppression."240
Like many other of these provisions, enticement actions had
direct counterparts in the North.24 ' There, enticing servants away
234 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 941 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull)
(quoting a Freedmen's Bureau report from Houston, Texas).
235 This compact was so detailed and extensive that the congressmen had the
clerk read it into the record. See id. at 517.
236 See id.
237 See id. at 39 (1865) (remarks of Sen. Wilson) (describing, among others, a
Georgia bill that had been passed: "[E]nticing servants away is a misdemeanor,
punishable by a fine of $500 or imprisonment for four months.").
238 Id.
239 Id. at 589 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Donnelly) (advocating the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill and criticizing Virginia's labor code).
240 Id.
241 See, e.g., Campbell v. Cooper, 34 N.H. 49, 61 (1856) ("It is well settled that
to entice away from the service of the master one to whose services he is entitled, is in
law an injury for which he may have redress in damages.").
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continued to be a civil, if not criminal, cause of action well into the
late nineteenth century. 4 2 The implication of this congressional
outrage was that the practice of employers treating employees as
property was inconsistent with the thirteenth amendment.
Another method of capturing and keeping employees under
contract was to require employees to forfeit all wages if they quit
before the end of the contract term. 24 3 Under the conventional con-
tract interpretation of the day, fixed term contracts required the
employee to complete the entire term as a condition precedent to
receiving any wages at all. Under that interpretation, workers could
not sue under quantum meruit for services already rendered,2 4 4 and
they were liable for the return of any wages already paid during the
contract term.2 4 5 The courts tended to enforce the rule rigidly
246
and, as a result, the rule greatly limited employees' job mobility.
Unless an employee could afford to forfeit wages for work already
performed, he could only take a newjob immediately after his formal
contract term expired. As a result, this system left only a narrow
window of time during which the average employee could take
advantage of other job opportunities.
Although this set of legal rules existed in some of the northern
states, 24 7 Senator Wilson protested when the state of Louisiana
passed a similar provision:
The Legislature of Louisiana has passed an act by which . . . any
freedman who makes a contract under it is perfectly at the control
242 See, e.g., Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 567 (1871) (noting that it is "a
familiar and well established doctrine . . . that one who entices away a servant, or
induces him to leave his master, may be held liable in damages"); Bixby v. Dunlap, 56
N.H. 456, 460-61 (1876) (allowing actions for enticement when employees are
induced to breach valid labor contracts and interrupt the master-servant
relationship). ,
243 See H. WooD, supra note 27, at 240.
244 See id. at 168-71. Servants could recover under quantum meruit only if their
master rescinded the entire contract for wrongful dismissal of the servant, waived the
contract, or abandoned the business for which the master employed the servant. See
id.
245 See id. at 240.
246 See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Wetmore, 2 Cal. 310, 312 (1852) (holding that when
a laborer contracts for a fixed time period, complete performance is a condition
precedent to recovery of any payment); Isaacs v. McAndrew, 1 Mont. 437, 451 (1872)
(holding that a laborer who voluntarily breaches a fixed time period contract before
completion of services has no claim for compensation for services rendered);
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Polly, Wood & Co., 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 447, 460 (1858)
(holding that full performance of a labor contract, if possible and legal, is a condition
precedent to recovery of payment).
247 See Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118, 122-23 (1976) (noting that no consensus ever existed over the rule).
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
and will of the man with whom he makes the contract. If that man
is a bad man, at the end of the year the freedman will not receive a
farthing for his year's labor. He can trump up charges to cheat and
defraud the laborer. So odious are these laws that the Freedmen's
Bureau has set them aside ... because they in reality reduc& the
freedman to the condition of a serf, or at any rate of a peon.
248
Senator Wilson also objected to a new Georgia forfeiture provi-
sion. 4' As he said: "I hope the people of the rebel States will under-
stand... that the slave codes of those States fell when slavery fell. If
these laws went down with slavery, what right have the people there
to make laws tending to the same end?",
250
Certainly, northern employers had as much opportunity to
manipulate work requirements to deny their employees wages as did
the southern planters. The northern employer could also cheat the
laborer and, no doubt, some did. The difference was that the Recon-
struction Congress distrusted the southern employers. In this light,
Senator Wilson was moved to state that it was the rule itself that was
odious, not simply the practice of manipulating the rule to advan-
tage. In Wilson's language, the law put the employee too much "at
the control and will" of the employer.
251
In addition to laws that discouraged employees from changing
jobs, another group of provisions attempted to fix area wage
rates. 52 Members of Congress widely criticized standardized wage
provisions constructed either privately by groups of planters or pub-
licly by the states because the artificially set wage rates prevented the
freedman's wage from rising in response to competitive demand.253
Thus, freedmen could not take advantage of any existing economic
opportunities in regions that were dependent on their labor. Repre-
sentative Donnelly identified the inherent injustice of this practice:
"[The freedman] shall work at a rate of wages to be fixed by a county
judge or a Legislature made up of white masters, or by combinations
248 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1866).
249 See id. at 39 (1865) (stating that under the provision, "[w]ages are forfeited
by leaving").
250 Id. at 340 (1866).
251 Id.
252 See, e.g., id. at 589 (remarks of Sen. Donnelly) (outlining the provisions of the
Virginia code).
253 See, e.g., id. at 1159-60 (remarks of Sen. Windom) (taking issue with the
President's belief that competition for the services of freedmen allowed them to set
their own wage rates, and arguing that the planters really set the rates).
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of white masters, and not in any case by himself' 254 Senator Windom
remarked that:
Planters combine together to compel them to work for such wages
as their former masters may dictate, and deny them the privilege of
hiring to any one without the consent of the master.... Do you
call that man free who cannot choose his own employer,-or name
the wages for which he will work?
255
Still other state laws attempted to regulate the requirements of
contract formation to disadvantage freedmen who, by custom or
inability, could not meet the necessary formalities. A Georgia bill
"provide[d] that if over one month, the contract must be made in
writing." '5 6 In an economy based on oral customs, requiring written
labor contracts disadvantaged both black and white laborers who
were generally illiterate.
Finally, employers attempted to gain control over employees by
intruding into matters of the employees' private lives or their off-
hours. In the post-emancipation South, some planters sought to
extend their control over freedmen's lives and thereby recapture
some of the prerogatives they had exercised previously.
Some employers attempted to control employees by specifying
certain conduct as cause for discharge, even if done outside of work.
For example, the James River Farmers Compact provided: "The
employer may discharge servants for disobedience, drunkenness,
immorality, or want of respect. '2 5 7 Presumably, under the compact,
employees could be discharged for drunkenness or statements indi-
cating want of respect that occurred in the privacy of their homes.
Other agreements provided for the discharge of employees who
exercised the right to vote.2 58 The members' criticisms of these pro-
visions demonstrate that the Reconstruction Congress' view of labor
autonomy included a sphere of private activities belonging to
employees which was beyond the control of employers.
Taken together, the variety of labor measures that Congress
condemned covers broad ground. These examples represent key
254 Id. at 589 (emphasis added).
255 Id. at 1160.
256 Id. at 39 (remarks of Sen. Wilson).
257 See id. at 517 (quoting the Compact).
258 See, e.g., A DOCUMENTARY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 562
(H. Aptheker ed. 1951) (noting that planters made agreements not to employ a
worker belonging to a political club in order to keep laborers away from the ballot
box); King, Postwar Plantation Life, in THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN HISTORY 230-31 (M.
Adler ed. 1969) (noting that planters did not allow freedmen on their plantations to
vote).
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developments in labor reform that were taking place over the course
of the nineteenth century. The pattern in the debates is clear. On
every measure, even those that only subtly or symbolically oppressed
the laborer, the Reconstruction Congress aligned itself on the side of
labor reform.
CONCLUSION
The rhetoric of the thirteenth amendment debates followed an
interesting dialectical pattern. In order to respond to the criticisms
of slavery's advocates, the Radical Republicans had to create the dual
strands of the labor vision. These dual strands grew out of the
Republican Party's origins in the Free Soil, Free Labor Movement as
well as the self-interest of the northern white working class. As the
condemnation of slavery provided the negative side of the labor
vision, the free labor ideal provided its affirmative side. The two
together present a powerful argument for constitutionally grounding
the protection of working people from overreaching subjugation and
abuses at the hands of employers.
The evidence suggests that the thirteenth amendment was
animated by a conception of labor reform broader than the elimina-
tion of racial servitude which was its catalyst. By abolishing slavery
and involuntary servitude, the framers of the thirteenth amendment
sought to advance both a floor of minimum rights for all working
men and an unobstructed sky of opportunities for their advance-
ment. One of the primary principles that led the Radicals to oppose
slavery was a desire to improve the condition of the working man.
259
From this perspective, race slavery was objectionable not only for its
pernicious racism, but also as the most obvious and brutal violation
of the free labor principle. The thirteenth amendment was a mile-
stone in the elimination of racial oppression, .but it was also a mile-
stone in the elimination of labor subjugation.
Moreover, in the minds of the Radicals, abolishing slavery and
involuntary servitude was more than merely abolishing the formal
legal status of human beings held as property. 60 The debates make
clear a much broader set of objectives. The Radical Republicans
259 See supra text accompanying note 55.
260 This point is most clearly seen in the texts of the debates, but it is even
somewhat evident from the text of the thirteenth amendment itself. The word
"slavery" appears to mean more than chattel slavery when read in the context of the
wage slavery debate. See supra text accompanying notes 159-62. By adding
"involuntary servitude," the language of the amendment speaks to conditions
broader than slavery.
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were interested in substantive reforms of the condition of the "worst
off working man," rather than merely his formal legal reclassifica-
tion.26' Senator Cowan's view, that the thirteenth amendment
merely broke the bonds between the slave and his master, clearly did
not represent the majority view.2 6 2 The Radicals' immediate con-
demnation of southern attempts to construct new oppressive labor
statuses in place of slavery indicates that additional conditions of ser-
vitude were within the scope of the Radicals' understanding of the
thirteenth amendment.
Still, the precise substantive dimensions of the concept of free
labor as viewed by the framers are somewhat hazy. The Radicals
sought to remove the slave from his master's household and create
for the free laborer the right to a household beyond the master's will
and control. 263 In addition, if the workers were to be free from
bondage, they had to be assured certain rights. They had to have the
right to quit and to secure new employment without the former
employer's consent. They also had to have the right to choose
employers and the terms on which they would work. The framers
considered it important that employers not be permitted to conspire
for the purpose of keeping wages low or for the purpose of limiting
the employees' opportunities.
Beyond those attempts to hold employees to service were the
additional dimensions of the employment relation, characterized by
the framers as more slave-like than free. The payment of minimal
token wages did not satisfy the framers as being anything other than
a perpetuation of slavery. The framers repeatedly stated that labor-
ers were entitled to the fruits of their labor and wages that were just
and fair. Taken together, these strands created a minimal sphere of
protection for the least well-off workers. Beyond that, within the
aspirational dimension of the vision, the congressmen posited that
workers had to have the opportunities necessary to elevate their con-
dition with the industrious application of labor. Workers were inher-
ently equal to their employers, and no class differentiations should
separate those who labored manually from those who did not.
It could be argued that the conditions of northern free laborers
at the time constituted the standard for measuring these minimums.
261 See, e.g., In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (G.G.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247)
(holding that a Maryland law attempting to reclassify all slaves as apprentices was in
violation of the thirteenth amendment prohibition of involuntary servitude).
262 See comments of Senators Howard, Stewart, and Wilson, supra notes 176-99
and accompanying text.
263 See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
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However, the statements of the Radicals' vision of free labor
exceeded the conditions of northern white working men. The Radi-
cals approached the task of reconstructing the South with the belief
that slavery had distorted the system and that free labor did not pre-
viously exist in the South, for either black or white men.264 Faced
with the task of creating something new, the congressmen sought to
achieve an even more elevated position for laborers than then
existed in the North. It is difficult to predict the arc of an
emancipatory idea such as the labor vision. Did the Radicals intend
that the thirteenth amendment be used to press advances beyond the
state of free labor that existed in the North at that time? The liberat-
ing impulse was there even if the vision was never fully realized, even
in the South. Certainly, one of the goals that impelled the Radicals
to oppose slavery was their interest in the continuing elevation of
workers,265 but there is always ambiguity about how far the framers
of a constitutional amendment can see into the future, and how far
they intend to push reform.
The ambiguity surrounding the Radicals' labor vision is much
the same as the ambiguity that shrouds their conception of the four-
teenth amendment's effect on northern race relations.2 66 As the
Radicals could not foresee the repressive Jim Crow era that would
set back the attainment of more egalitarian race relations, 26 7 so too,
they could not foresee the forces that would concentrate private
power in the hands of employers and threaten the continual eleva-
tion of workers that they so cherished.
Beyond its historical significance, this vision of free labor has
potentially far-reaching implications for constitutional interpretation
of the thirteenth amendment 268 and for many aspects of the modem
employment relation. Regardless of one's views about original
intent,269 the texts can teach many lessons about free labor. The
Radicals' statements of purpose, and the blueprint they left as they
264 See supra notes 134-36 & 145 and accompanying text.
265 See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
266 See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 58-59 (1955) (stating that it cannot be assumed that the Radicals wished for a
changed role of the Constitution despite their fervor in pressing for changes).
267 See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 8-9 (2d ed. 1980).
268 For a brief discussion of various interpretative theories of the Civil War
amendments, see Belz, The Civil War Amendments to the Constitution: The Relevance of
Original Intent, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 115 (1988).
269 To a certain extent, this argument rests on the legal relevance of the intent
of the framers. For an excellent but brief discussion of the issues raised in using
framers' intent in constitutional interpretation, see G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C.
SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTrTlONAL LAw 34-36 (1986).
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critically evaluated the conditions of the freedmen, provide a rich
repository for legal argument and analysis about the modern
condition.
It is interesting to note that immediately after the Civil War at
least one court did attempt to apply lessons learned from the slave
experience to the legal treatment of other employees.2 70 Less than a
decade after Reconstruction, however, influential treatises that codi-
fied the common law of master and servant virtually ignored these
developments. As a result, the common law evolved without regard
for the constitutional tradition of free labor; and that same common
law has remained the law of employment relations in many states for
most of this century.
27 1
As we have contemplated removing the badges of slavery that
persist in race relations, 272 the labor vision invites us to begin strip-
ping away the vestiges of slavery and involuntary servitude that have
remained in employment relations law and that continue to influence
legal opinions and popular expectations. The task will not be a sim-
ple one, as these vestiges are deeply embedded. An analysis of these
implications is beyond this Article's scope, but a few tentative appli-
cations of the vision can be identified. Of course, each of these
270 See, e.g., Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phila. 6, 7 (1865) (court using analogy to slavery
to deny employer theater an order enjoining actress from performing at competing
theaters).
271 How and why this free labor tradition was lost is itself an interesting story to
explore. A leading authority on master-servant law in the late nineteenth century,
H.G. Wood, completely ignored the prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude
in his influential work, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT COVERING
THE RELATION, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES (2d ed. 1886).
Wood's treatise, and others, turned out to be very influential in shaping state
common law, and the Supreme Court later reinforced the assumptions these treatises
made about employer prerogatives in decisions about economic substantive due
process in the employment context. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)
(holding that an employer has a right to discharge, at will, an employee who joins a
union against the wishes of the employer).
272 See e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) ("The plain intention
[of the thirteenth amendment] was to abolish slavery of whatever name and form and
all its badges and incidents; to render impossible any state of bondage; to make labor
free .. "); see also Buchanan, supra note 5, at 21, 622-28 (discussing the Supreme
Court's early interpretation of the thirteenth amendment and how the Court
"construed [slavery] liberally to include not only the formal system of slavery... [but
also] all of the system's indicia, incidents and badges."). Unfortunately, in recent
years, the Supreme Court has not been very receptive to this argument. See, e.g.,
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (Court rejecting respondents' claim that a
state's actions, increasing the sense of physical separation between black and white
neighborhoods, could be characterized as a badge or incident of slavery under the
thirteenth amendment).
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sketches requires more thorough examination and additional
qualifications.
The place to begin is with the key attributes that distinguish
slave labor from free labor. First among these is the scope of the
right to quit and the right to seek new employment without the per-
mission of one's former employer. These rights determine what
penalties employers may impose on employees who quit and how
employers may attempt to control their employees' access to com-
peting employment opportunities. 273 Thus, for example, the thir-
teenth amendment could supply a public policy forbidding an
employer from discharging a worker for simply looking into employ-
ment elsewhere.274. This policy also has potential implications for
the legality of covenants not to compete.2 75 In addition, the framers
considered it important that employers not be permitted to conspire
for the purpose of keeping wages low. This tenet would affect multi-
employer bargaining units, in which employers join forces instead of
competing against each other for employees' services.
Second, beyond those measures that attempt to hold employees
to service are the additional dimensions of the employment relation
that the framers identified as more slave-like than free. Since the
framers considered token wages to be merely a perpetuation of slav-
ery under another guise, laborers should have a legitimate claim to a
certain minimal wage level.276 What constitutes "just and fair
wages" seems to be contingent on changing economic conditions or
the cost of living. The framers were obviously concerned about the
273 See generally M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 705-37 (discussing employers'
ability to impose penalties on and exercise control over employees); H. SPECTER & M.
FINKIN, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION § 15.02 (1989) [hereinafter H.
SPECTER] (same). Arguably, these rights also have implications for a second
employer who relies on former employers' references when making employment
decisions. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d. 876, 888 (Minn.
1986).
274 See McCartney v. Meadowview Manor, 353 Pa. Super. 34, 508 A.2d 1254
(1986); H. SPECTER, supra note 273, at § 10.49 nn. 216 & 222.
275 See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 713-37. A covenant not to compete bars
an employee from competing with the former employer and is generally enforceable
if reasonable and supported by consideration. See H. SPECTER, supra note 273, at
§§ 8.01-8.14.
276 This is usually taken care of today by federal and state minimum wage laws.
However, it may suggest that exclusions from minimum wage coverage (or other
labor protective laws) may be challenged constitutionally. See Linder, What Is an
Employee? Why It Does, But Should Not, Matter, 7 L. & INEQUALITY 155, 184-85 (1989);
Linder, Farm Workers and Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in the New Deal,
65 TEx. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1987) (discussing the exclusion of farm workers from
the Fair Labor Standards Act).
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ability of freedmen to earn enough not only for their own subsis-
tence2 77 but also to acquire a base of independence from which they
could rise in the world. These issues challenge the very foundation
of our common assumption that an employee's right is limited to
accepting or rejecting whatever wage the employer offers.
278
Third, the debates establish a constitutional basis on which
working people can ground the popularly held expectation that an
employee's home life is, or at least should be, secure from his or her
employer's demand.2 79 Although the debates about separating the
slave from the master's household are part of the nineteenth century
evolutionary trend that tended to eliminate those patriarchal prerog-
atives from the employment relationship, vestiges of employer con-
trol have not been totally eliminated.280 Employees file dozens of
lawsuits each year to stop employer attempts to control such deeply
personal and arguably non-job-related issues as employees' personal
relationships 2 81 and political affiliations.
28 2
The thirteenth amendment arguably limits the ability of employ-
ers to command employees' obedience in areas that primarily involve
the employee's privacy and autonomy.28" This interpretation is
277 Even those congressional commentators who claimed that the freedmen
could take care of themselves without additional federal intervention, usually the
Johnson Republicans, premised that opinion on a view that there would be a labor
shortage that would allow the freedmen to bargain well for their services. See supra
text accompanying note 203.
278 SeeJ. ATLESON, supra note 13, at 11-15. Assuring employees the right to the
fruits of their labor also has implications for employer control by contract of
employee-generated intellectual property or ideas.
279 See S. TERKEL, WORKING 17-25 (1975).
280 See Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 335, 344 (1989); see generally W. RORABAUGH, supra note 96 (discussing the
liberating spirit that effected change in the master-apprentice relationship in the 19th
century).
281 See, e.g., Trumbaur v. Group Health Coop., 635 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Wash.
1986) (employee discharged for prior relationship with new supervisor); Salazar v.
Furr's Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1403 (D.N.M. 1986) (employee discharged because husband
worked for competitor); Rogers v. IBM, 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (discharge
for relationship with subordinate); Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., 150 Cal. App. 3d
1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1984) (employee of 25 years discharged for relationship
with another employee); Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985) (discharge for
fraternizing with fellow employee); Patton v.J.C. Penney Co., 301 Or. 117, 719 P.2d
854 (1986) (fired for maintaining relationship with co-worker); Ward v. Frito-Lay
Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (1980) (employee discharged for living with
co-worker).
282 See, e.g., Davis v. Louisiana Computer Corp., 394 So. 2d 678 (La. Ct. App.
1981) (employee fired because of his candidacy for political office).
283 This theory of the potential reach of the thirteenth amendment could be
applied to numerous cases involving issues of employees' personal lives. See, e.g,
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grounded in statements indicating that the slave was no longer under
the master's patriarchal dominion. Other statements affirmatively
created the laborer's right to domestic privacy beyond the masters'
command.
This aspect of the labor vision challenges the foundation of the
employment-at-will doctrine.2" 4 This doctrine provides that an
employer can require an employee to do virtually anything under
penalty of termination, 28 5 unless the request is specifically banned by
a written contract provision, a statute or common law rule, or an
express statement of public policy.28" The doctrine renders employ-
ees vulnerable whenever they assert claims of privacy, autonomy, or
personal security in resistance to their employers. 28 7 Employers
have on occasion attempted to interfere in the employee's choice of
whom to date or marry;28 8 they have fired unmarried women for
choosing to bear children;28 9 and they have strip-searched employ-
ees on a moment's notice.290 The doctrine provides few limits on
this kind of employer overreaching, and most often does not even
require that the employer provide a business justification for its
"request. ' ' 29 1 Yet, these employer prerogatives are exactly the types
Ferguson v. Freedom Forge Co., 604 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (association with
former company president); Page Airways v. New York State Div. of Human Rights,
50 A.D.2d 83, 376 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1975) (hair length), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 877, 352 N.E.2d
140 (1976); Martin v. Capital Cities Media, 354 Pa. Super. 199, 511 A.2d 830 (1986)
(fired for placing ad in rival paper). This theory could possibly apply to drug testing
as well. See generally Cross & Haney, Legal Issues Included in Private Sector Medical Testing
ofJob Applicants and Employees, 20 IND. L. REv. 453 (1987) (discussing the intrusiveness
of medical testing into the private lives of applicants and employees); Hartsfield,
Medical Examinations as a Method of Investigating Employee Wrongdoing, 37 LAB. L.J. 692
(1986) (same).
284 See M. RoTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 738-49.
285 Id. Refusal to follow an employer demand may constitute disobedience,
disloyalty, or insubordination.
286 Id.
287 Under this doctrine, the employee, before entering the employment
relationship, is forced to negotiate for his or her own sphere of privacy in order for it
to be respected by the employer. Given the usual power arrangement between
employees and employers, this assumption is impractical.
288 See, e.g., Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524
(1984) (marketing manager discharged by employer because of her romantic
relationship with manager of a rival firm).
289 See, e.g., Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986)
(firing female employee for choosing to bear child).
290 See, e.g., Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc., 54 Or. App. 480, 635 P.2d 657 (1981)
(employees strip-searched without prior notice).
291 See generally M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 12, at 436-60, 465-82 (noting cases on
privacy and employer regulation of off-work activity). A few courts have begun
making in-roads on the totality of employer freedom by causes of action such as the
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of intrusive master's prerogatives that the Radical Republicans
would have characterized as describing the slave rather than the free
laborer. The thirteenth amendment debates could be used to pro-
vide a base for grounding the employee's expectation that there are
certain issues of privacy and autonomy that are not the employer's
business. 
29 2
Each of these examples presents an instance of a legal doctrine
formulated without regard to the constitutional tradition of free
labor. By intending to usher in a state of basic employee rights and
by articulating certain criteria as the hallmarks of free labor, the
Reconstruction Congress identified a storehouse of public policies
that should be revived and considered in reformulating the law gov-
erning employment relations.
293
tort of outrageous conduct. See, e.g., Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc., 54 Or. App. 480, 483,
635 P.2d 657, 661 (1981) (court recognized the tort of outrageous conduct if an
employer's actions exceed the "bounds of social toleration" and is in reckless
disregard of the action's effect on the employee).
292 There are several theories on which to base the thirteenth amendment's
protection of the employee against employer interference in primarily personal
matters. In doctrinal terms, the employer's insistence on intrusive commands could
be deemed an unconstitutional condition of employment. Alternatively, the
thirteenth amendment's expanded interpretation could be used as the foundation of
an express public policy of limiting employer's discretion.
There is little precedent upon which to base the former theory, because the
development of theories of unconstitutional conditions is premised on
unconstitutional conditions imposed by the state. See Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1421-22 (1989). The expanded interpretation of
the thirteenth amendment, however, stands on firmer ground. Since the thirteenth
amendment, unlike the other provisions of the Constitution, is directed at abuse of
private power rather than abuse of public power, there should be no impediment to
finding a condition of employment imposed by the employer to be an
unconstitutional condition.
Another method by which the employment-at-will doctrine could be reformed is
the recognition by the courts that this type of employer overreaching is against public
policy. See M. RoTsTIIN, supra note 12, at 753-67. Grounds which traditionally have
been deemed to be "public policies of the state" have often been limited to express
legislative statements such as workmen's compensation statutes. The affirmative
liberties that the Reconstruction Congress sought to bestow on working people can
be viewed as an additional source of public policies.
293 Since there are relatively few cases examining the thirteenth amendment's
labor law applications, there is little precedent blocking development in this area.
The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), may present the only
significant limiting precedent. For a discussion of the free labor concept in the
Slaughterhouse Cases, see Dudziak, The Social History of the Slaughterhouse Cases:
The Butchers of New Orleans and the Sacred Right of Labor (unpublished
manuscript on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
In addition, section 3 of the amendment authorizes Congress to enact legislation
to further the amendment's purposes. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 3. At the very
least, given the free labor purpose of the amendment, this section authorizes
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These examples by no means exhaust the interpretive possibili-
ties; they simply derive most directly from examples cited in the
Reconstruction debates. Giving full effect to the core labor ideal of
the Reconstruction Congress would suggest another entire range of
meaning. Recognizing labor as the central value that creates prop-
erty, regarding the employee as the social and political equal of his
or her employer, ensuring that the employee is able to enjoy fully
"the fruits of his toil," and guaranteeing that free institutions con-
tinue to elevate the condition of working individuals, would propel
the thirteenth amendment into a sphere of influence beyond the
blueprint's concrete examples. If the thirteenth amendment's pur-
pose of introducing a state of minimum employee rights were read as
broadly as it is described by the Radical Republicans, the amend-
ment would provide protection against a wide range of employer
overreaching.
Clearly, the free labor principle was only one of the animating
ideals of the thirteenth amendment.29 4 Nonetheless, its existence
and influence have been neglected in the development of law. The
remarkable point is not that the thirteenth amendment lends itself to
a broader reading but that, unlike the clauses of the first or four-
teenth amendments,2 95 further doctrinal interpretation has not
developed its meaning.296 Instead, restrictive interpretation has
reduced the amendment to its least common denominator: the aboli-
tion of mid-nineteenth century southern racial chattel slavery. This
reduction has occurred to the point that the amendment has virtually
no possibility of application. 29 7 Would the framers of the Constitu-
tion have amended the Constitution so that the amendment would
become obsolele in less than a decade? 298 Could the drafters of the
Congress to adopt certain measures to redress power imbalances in the employment
relation without invoking the commerce clause.
294 Numerous comments in the debates were addressed at eliminating racism.
For an excellent examination of these themes, see Cottrol, The Thirteenth Amendment
and the North's Overlooked Egalitarian Heritage, I1 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 198 (1989).
295 For historical description of the evolution of these provisions, see P. BREST
& S. LEVENSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (1986).
296 The limited exception to this statement would be the brief line of cases
starting with Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1896) and Bailey v. Alabama, 219
U.S. 219 (1911). See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)
(developer's refusal to sell home to a black couple held to be an incident of slavery).
297 See United States v. Kozminski, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 2761 (1988) (holding that a
criminal statute based on the thirteenth amendment was to be narrowly construed in
a manner consistent with the understanding at the time of the amendment's
adoption).
298 If the strictest construction had been maintained, it is doubtful that the
Supreme Court could have ruled in favor of the laborers in Bailey v. Alabama, 219
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amendment have contemplated that the narrow interpretation of
Senator Cowan, an interpretation that the Republican majority
denounced, would become the only remaining legacy of the thir-
teenth amendment?
The history of the labor vision of the thirteenth amendment is
the history of a pattern of labor reform in the most dramatic and
fundamental way, a reform of the Constitution itself. Modern inter-
pretation of this amendment has been much too narrowly circum-
scribed. The point of examining the period of Reconstruction is to
convey the rich and multifaceted meaning of the debates, which must
be understood if one is to understand the texts adopted.
As Representative Thomas Davis of New York stated in the
debates:
[T]his world is after all a progressive world. Its advances are slow
but sure .... We see evidences of progress in the institutions of
society as well as in the physical world .... The despotism and
tyranny of old Governments and empires, and the barbaric customs
of former generations, are passing away. Other institutions have
succeeded, better but not yet perfect, and these in turn must give
way to the more beneficent and more perfect creations of a
brighter future. And perhaps hereafter some explorer in our his-
tory shall find for the astonishment of his times, a monster fossil
more wonderful than the mastodon, and more terrible than the
pterodactylus, which shall be recognized as the last vestige of Afri-
can slavery.
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If one looks to the history of the Reconstruction debate for a broader
labor vision, it is there to be found.
U.S. 219, 241 (1911) (stating that although the thirteenth amendment was concerned
with "African slavery," it was not limited to that, but rather was intended to abolish
slavery, its badges and incidents, and any form of bondage), or Pollock v. Williams,
322 U.S. 4, 17 (1943) (broadly interpreting the thirteenth amendment's purpose as
"not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary
labor throughout the United States").
299 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 155 (1865).
